Bouarfa v. Mayorkas, (U.S.)

Back in the depths of time, a foreign national wanted to become a U.S. Citizen. He married a young woman who was a U.S. Citizen, living in the U.S.

He received his visa to come to America.

When enough time had passed, he asked his wife to sponsor him to become a U.S. citizen. She did not want to. He offered her $5000 to do so. She refused, they divorced and he left the country.

This happens more often than you might think. It happened to a friend of mine.

She wasn’t a beautiful woman, she was very plain. A man from the Middle East in the US on a student visa “fell in love” with her. He wined and dined her. Treated her in ways nobody else had.

They got married. He got his green card. They had a beautiful girl together. She sponsored him for citizenship. He became a U.S. Citizen.

He then divorced her, took their kid back to his home country. Married the girl who had been promised to him before he came to the US.

In the case of Miss Bouarfa:

Amina Bouarfa is a U. S. citizen who married Ala’a Hamayel, a noncitizen and Palestinian national. They have three young children, all of whom are U. S. citizens. A few years after they married, Bouarfa fled a visa petition on Hamayel’s behalf.

USCIS initially approved the petition. But two years later, the agency sent Bouarfa a Notice of Intent to Revoke its approval. The agency informed Bouarfa that it had uncovered evidence suggesting that, nearly a decade earlier, her husband had entered into a marriage for the purpose of evading immigration laws. According to the agency, during an interrogation, Hamayel’s ex-wife had stated that her marriage with Hamayel had been “fraudulent” and that she had asked him for $5,000 before fling a visa petition on his behalf. App. to Pet. for Cert. 14a. The agency told Bouarfa that, had it been aware of this evidence at the time it reviewed her visa petition, it never would have approved it.
—Bouarfa v. Mayorkas, 2024 604 U.S. 6

Miss Bouarfa appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which agreed with the state, his visa stayed revoked. She then appealed to the Federal District Court, claiming the state lacked sufficient evidence to support their determination.

The state got the case dismissed. 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) has this to say:

Denials of discretionary relief
Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of title 28, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, and except as provided in subparagraph (D), and regardless of whether the judgment, decision, or action is made in removal proceedings, no court shall have jurisdiction to review–
1. any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section 1182(h), 1182(i), 1229b, 1229c, or 1255 of this title, or
2. any other decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security, other than the granting of relief under section 1158(a) of this title.

— 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)

They appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court, which affirmed the inferior court’s ruling. His visa was still revoked.

It concluded that the text of § 1155 “makes clear that the Secretary’s authority to revoke the approval of a petition is discretionary.” Id., at 1162. In the court’s view, it made no difference that the agency rested its revocation on a determination that would have required the agency to deny the petition in the first instance. “[N]othing in the statute,” the court reasoned, “requires the Secretary to revoke the approval of a petition in any circumstance, even when the Department later determines that the approval was in error.” Ibid.
—id. at 12–13

The question the Supreme Court chose to resolve:

Whether federal courts have jurisdiction to review the Secretary’s revocation of the agency’s prior approval of a visa petition. 601 U. S. 1166 (2024).3 Bouarfa challenges the Secretary’s revocation on the assumption that the fact that her husband is not in removal proceedings does not affect the jurisdictional analysis.
—id. at 13

The problem for Bouarfa’s argument is that § 1154(c) nowhere suggests that its command extends beyond the point of approval. Nothing in the provision mentions revocation. And we need not guess in what situations Congress wanted the Secretary to revoke the agency’s approval, because Congress answered that question directly: The Secretary “may” do so whenever he “deems” there to be “good and sufficient cause.” § 1155. This specific grant of discretion to revoke forecloses the argument that Congress silently mandated revocation in certain situations.
—id. at 16

In § 1155, Congress granted the Secretary broad authority to revoke an approved visa petition “at any time, for what he deems to be good and sufficient cause.” Such a revocation is thus “in the discretion of” the agency. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). Where § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) applies, then, it bars judicial review of the Secretary’s revocation under § 1155. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

It is so ordered.
—id. at 19

Conclusion

Once the back and forth with the inferior courts is completed, Khalil will lose.

The Supreme Court found, 9-0, that the Secretary has the choice to revoke any visa or green card for anything he feels is sufficient. Judicial review is not allowed under U.S. Law.

The ONLY challenge they would have is a Constitutional challenge, which they have not really made.

Conclusion

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