Cases

When the Arguments Are that Bad: Nguyen v. Bonta

This case involves California’s one gun per month infringement.

On Dec 18, 2020, nearly 4 years ago, Michelle Nguyen and others filed a complaint against Xavier Becerra, the Attorney General of California asking for injunctive and declaratory relief.

Because this happened before the Bruen opinion issued, it is couched in terms of Heller and levels of scrutiny. Remember, arguing that interest-balancing was wrong was a losing argument at that time.

They claimed that their rights were being infringed because “arms” is plural and limiting the purchase of guns to just one per month is singular. Thus making the law unconstitutional, on its face.

This case was a series of motions and counter motions. Both parties trying to limit what the other party could present as “evidence”. On Dec 6, 2023, three years after the case was filed, a motion hearing was held. This is the place where the parties argue why their motions are better before the judge.

On March 28, 2024, the court issued its judgement. This brings this case to completion at the district level.

The court found for the plaintiffs. The good guys. The court issued an injunction against California Penal Code §§ 27535 and 27540(f) as violating the Second Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment.

Knowing the state would appeal, Judge Hayes put a 30-day administrative stay on his ruling. This is perfectly normal.

The state filed their appeal the next day.

The Ninth Circuit administrative panel, continued its unbroken record in Second Amendment cases, issued a stay pending appeal.

Appellants have established a sufficient likelihood of success on the merits of this appeal and made a sufficient showing on the relative equities to justify a stay pending appeal.

This is pure spite. The Supreme Court has said, on multiple occasions, how the Winter’s factors are to be addressed. First, the merits of the case, second that irreparable harm, third the balance of equities, and finally that the injunction is in the public interest.

The order by the administrate panel did not address the merits of the case. This is an instant showing of a rogue court.

If the case is a civil rights case, and the party seeking the injunction is likely to win on the merits, the analysis is over. The denial of a civil right is “irreparable harm”. The balance of equities always tips to the party being irreparably harmed, the public has no interest in enforcing an unconstitutional law.

Thus, this admin panel did a crackerjack job of ignoring the law.

The administrative panel issued their stay on April 24, before the administrative stay expired.

The case is then calendared to be heard by a merits panel.

That took place on August 14th, 2024. It was a complete disaster for the state.

There are more than a few channels that have done reviews of the oral arguments.

So how bad were the arguments by the state? Their stay pending appeal was reversed.

The order (Dkt. 9) granting Defendants’ motion for a stay pending appeal (Dkt. 3) is REVERSED. Before: Owens, Bade, and Forrest, Circuit Judges.

It took the merits panel less than a day to issue the order reversing the stay pending appeal, in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.

This is a good time to buy stock in heater vendors in hell, it has done froze over.

hammer, libra, dish

When the State wants more weasel words

The state is constantly looking for weasel words in Supreme Court opinions to further their arrogant subjugation of their subjects. We see this in how they misconstrued the language of —United States V. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939) to claim that the Second Amendment only protects militias.

We see this when they misconstrue —District of Columbia v. Heller, 467 U.S. 837 (2008) to mean that “presumptively constitutional” means that any infringement is constitutional.

We see this when they misconstrue —New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. V. Bruen, 142 S.Ct. 2111 (U.S. 2022) to mean that anyplace can be designated as a “sensitive location” where infringements are required. Like defining all of Times Square as a sensitive place.

The state is constantly looking for any words that could be taken to mean that infringement is allowed.

Opinion, United States v. Rahimi, 602 S.Ct. ____ (U.S. 2024) has far too many weasel words for the state to latch onto. Bad facts make for bad laws.

Schoenthal v. Raoul in Chicago shows exactly this.

After Rahimi was issued, the state in every case rushed to bring that opinion into their arguments. Not because their case had anything to do with individuals found to be credible threat of physical violence to another who had a court of law issue a domestic violence restraining order against them, but because they wanted to use the weasel words.

In Schoenthal the state wanted a status hearing to set a supplemental briefing schedule. This is the official way to get more arguments before the court, regardless of the current status of the case.

The state says it is a joint motion. This is true in fact, but not in spirit.

The state wants to brief the court regarding how wonderful Rahimi is for their case. The plaintiffs (good guys) just want equal time, if the court allows the state to submit additional arguments.

The judge said “No”.

Now, the language the state is trying so hard to get into the record is suggest a law trapped in amberid.. This is where the Supreme Court explained how to do regulation matching. The state latches on to “it doesn’t have to be an exact match, so our horrible, not even close, matches should be allowed.”

So the state made a second motion to brief Rahimi to the court. This time they included the language they felt would save their case.

The judge said “no” a second time.

So the state, instead of requesting permission to brief the court on Rahimi, submitted a notice of supplemental authority regarding Rahimi. This was not the simple, “We wish to bring to the court’s attention that Rahimi was decided, no, this was a short brief with the state’s arguments.

Therefore, the court said “no” again, a bit more forcibly.

MINUTE entry before the Honorable Iain D. Johnston: Ms. Foxx’s notice of supplemental authority [106] is stricken. The Court is aware of Rahimi and has already denied two motions raised in light of Rahimi. The Court is making every effort to issue its opinion in a timely manner, and these filings are hindering those efforts. Please stop.
Schoenthal v. Raoul, No. 3:22-cv-50326 (N.D. Ill.)

Alec Baldwin Gets Away with Murder?

Alec Baldwin’s case was dismissed with prejudice.

What does this mean, IANAL view point

Alec Baldwin was charged with involuntary manslaughter after he shot and killed his cinematographer, Halyna Hutchins.

The relevant facts: Alec Baldwin was holding a real gun. Alec Baldwin pointed the gun at a person. Alec Baldwin cocked the gun (pulled the hammer back and set it on the sear). Alec Baldwin then pressed the trigger, causing the gun to fire, killing Halyna Hutchins.

Irrelevant facts: Somebody told Alec Baldwin that the gun was unloaded (Treat every gun as if it is loaded). Somebody said they loaded dummy rounds into the gun (Treat every gun as if it is loaded). He says he did not pull the trigger, (Never point your gun at something you are not willing to destroy/kill.). In addition, he injured the director(?) (Be sure of your target and what is beyond it).

Other irrelevant facts: Baldwin is just a trained monkey. He can’t be expected to know the safety rules. Baldwin is so stupid that he should never have been handed a real gun. It was somebody else’s responsibility to make sure that the gun was “safe”.

Things went wrong on that set. Some of it appears to be Baldwin’s responsibility. Including rushing the safety crew, disregarding safety “suggestions” and overall shitty safety.

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Case Dismissed, They Miss Trump, Again

There were several cases GVRed at the end of June. This is one of the methods the Supreme Court uses to communicate with the inferior courts.

What they are doing is telling the inferior courts, all of them, that this opinion we issued, applies to these sorts of cases.

The Loper Bright case was the death of Chevron. Chevron was the horrible opinion out of the Supreme Court that said, if the agency administrating a law thinks it is ambiguous, then it is ambiguous. If it is ambiguous, the courts must use the agency’s interpretation of the law.

Since the Chevron opinion, the Supreme Court has been attempting to “fix it”. The problem was that they needed the inferior courts to do rational, reasonable things. Too many of the inferior courts did not do reasonable, rational things.

Chevron became a catch-all for any power hungry agency.

The Loper Bright opinion told the inferior courts, “Stop avoiding your job. You are the final arbitrator on questions of law, not any party. Get out there and read the law and do the right thing.”

Judge Aileen M. Cannon did exactly this.

Trump’s team had filed a motion to dismiss his case based on the theory that Jack Smith did not have the authority to bring charges.

While everybody has been calling Jack Smith “The Special Counsel”, that is a position that must exist.

The Trump motion points out that the Constitution defines how “Officers of the United States” are appointed. Those officers are separated into “inferior” or “principal” officers.

Principal officers must be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.

Jack Smith argues that he is an inferior officer.

While inferior officers can be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in Heads of Departments. — U.S. Constitution

The state, through Jack Smith, argued that his appointment was lawful because it was done under an ambiguous law. Since it is an ambiguous law, the DoJ was able to say, under Chevron that of course they got it right.

But with Chevron dead, the Court looked at the law and determined that the DoJ did not have the authority to create the position. Since they could not create the position, Jack Smith had no special standing. I.e., his authority was no more than yours or mine.

This is another win for us. And this case was decided without a need for looking at Presidential Immunity for official acts.

When the Court is tired of the state’s BS

In August 2022, Thomas and Diane Lamarco filed suit in the eastern district of New York. This is a different challenge to §922(g).

If you read §922(g), or you are familiar with from 4473, you know there is a long list of people that are prohibited from possessing firearms. We are currently arguing about the constitutionality of most of §922(g).

In Rahimi the Supreme Court said that people who have been adjudicated guilty in a court of law of being a credible threat of physical violence to another, can be temporarily denied their Second Amendment protected rights.

The Supreme Court has not said anything about non-violent people, nor about people who have served their time.

But did you know that there is another entire group of prohibited people? There is.

These are the people that reside on the same property as a prohibited person. The state assumes that if a person resides at a property, they have access to any of the firearms at that property. It doesn’t matter whether the firearm is secured or not. The state assumes the prohibited person has access.

At some point, officers responded to a “mental health assistance” call for somebody else at the residence. This response, in Suffolk County, means that the other residents lose their gun rights.

The LaMarcos make no effort to explain how the suspension of their pistol licenses supposedly constitutes a Second Amendment violation. Rather, they audaciously assert that they are not required to do so. They contend that under New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 213 L. Ed. 2d 387 (2022) (“Bruen”), decided after the suspensions, defendants must affirmatively justify their actions because the possession and carrying of handguns for self-defense is within the “plain text” of the Second Amendment.
United States V. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939)

They want to keep and bear arms. The Second Amendment is implicated. The burden shifts to the state to prove a historical tradition of matching firearms regulations in this Nation’s history.

This was filed on July 1st. The court was having none of it.

In its papers, the Suffolk County Attorney fails to argue the proper application of New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022) by dodging the issue, asserting that the subject matter of this case is somehow outside the ambit of the Second Amendment. See Docket Entry 28-35 at 11-13. This assertion is spurious, seemingly interjected for dilatory purposes. It is obvious that this case involves the proper application of the Second Amendment, and arguments surrounding Bruen are critical to its proper resolution. Indeed, Ms. Zwilling, the Assistant County Attorney handling this case, is well aware of the applicability of the Second Amendment given her work in Torcivia v. Suffolk Cnty., New York. 409 F. Supp. 3d 19, 36 (E.D.N.Y. 2019), affid, 17 F.4th 342 (2d Cir. 2021) (“There can be no question that [Suffolk County’s] Revocation and Seizure Policies implicated conduct within the scope of the Second Amendment. At least least one of the Policies resulted in the revocation of Plaintiff’s pistol license and the temporary seizure of Plaintiff’s firearms, and limited Plaintiff’s ability to possess handguns.”). Moreover, the County’s assertion that Bruen is not retroactive is equally preposterous. See, e.g., Passalacqua v. Cnty. of Suffolk, No. 19-CV-5738 (GRB)(SIL), 2022 WL 21795141, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2022) (“Further, the fact that the events at issue took place prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Bruen has no bearing on its applicability to the present motions.”) (citation omitted). Notably, Ms. Zwilling also represents the County in Passalacqua. Thus, the County is DIRECTED to file a supplemental brief of no more than 10 pages setting forth its position on the proper application of Bruen and United States v. Rahimi, No. 22-915, 2024 WL 3074728 (U.S. June 21, 2024) to the pending motion within 10 days. Counsel for plaintiffs shall have two weeks to file a response. Given the absence of a good faith basis for the County’s position, the Court will, pursuant to Rule 11, award Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees for the preparation of this supplemental brief. Ordered by Judge Gary R. Brown on 7/2/2024.

This is a text order, there is no citation to a paper. It is in the docket for the case.

This is a spanking of the state. No doubt about it. Good news.

The GVRs

What is a GVR?

The process for an appeal is to request that a case be heard. When the superior court Grants that appeal, the case is moved to a final opinion. One of the possible outcomes is that the inferior court’s opinion is Vacated.

When an inferior court’s opinion is vacated, the superior court has an option to Remand the case back to the inferior court for a do-over.

When the superior court does this without hearing anything from the parties outside the request to be heard, it is called “GVR”.

If the superior court were to just “GVR” a case, it wouldn’t be helpful to the inferior court. Nobody learns from “You are mistaken, do it over.” There needs to be some level of feedback.

On July 2nd, 2024, the Supreme Court issued their final orders of the 2023 term.

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Harrel v. Raoul, Denial of Certiorari

The State of Illinois enacted a law that makes it a felony to possess what Illinois branded “assault weapons,” a term defined to include AR–15s. See Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 720, §5/24–1.9(a)(1)(J)(ii)(II) (West 2023). “The AR–15 is the most popular semi-automatic rifle” in America and is therefore undeniably “in common use today.” Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F. 3d 1244, 1287 (CADC 2011) (KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting); see also Garland v. Cargill, 602 U. S. 406, 430–431 (2024) (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting) (describing “semiautomatic rifles” such as the AR–15 as “commonly available”). Petitioners sought a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the law, arguing that the law violates their Second Amendment right to “keep and bear Arms.” The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected petitioners’ request for a preliminary injunction, concluding “that the AR–15 … is not protected by the Second Amendment.” Bevis v. Naperville, 85 F. 4th 1175, 1197 (2023). According to the Seventh Circuit, the rifle selected by millions of Americans for self-defense and other lawful purposes does not even fall within the scope of the Arms referred to by the Second Amendment. Ibid. This Court is rightly wary of taking cases in an interlocutory posture. But, I hope we will consider the important issues presented by these petitions after the cases reach final judgment.
United States V. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939) Statement of Justice Thomas

We knew that Sotomayor wasn’t the sharpest crayon in the box, I love how Justice Thomas cites to her opinion saying that AR-15s are in common use.

…does not even fall within the scope of …: That should have Easterbrook and Woods looking for a rock to crawl under. That is a strong rebuke, coming from the Supreme Court.

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Immunity for official acts

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR has thoroughly addressed the Court’s flawed reasoning and conclusion as a matter of history, tradition, law, and logic. I agree with every word of her powerful dissent. I write separately to explain, as succinctly as I can, the theoretical nuts and bolts of what, exactly, the majority has done today to alter the paradigm of accountability for Presidents of the United States. I also address what that paradigm shift means for our Nation moving forward.
United States V. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939) Justice Jackson, dissenting.

I remember taking some classes back in the olden times, where they described the Republican form of government that was created for these United States. I seem to remember that the federal government was made up of three branches, the legislative branch tasked with creating laws, the executive branch, tasked with implementing those laws and has veto powers over laws passed by the legislative branch, and the judicial branch, tasked with resolving disputes about the meaning of the laws.

If the President decides that a bill that has passed congress is unacceptable, he can veto that bill. If congress strongly disagrees with his opinion, they can override that veto.

Once the bill has become law, the President, as head of the executive branch, implements the law.

If there are any disputes about the law, that goes before the judiciary for their opinion.

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Chevron is dead, long live Loper

Just what is —United States V. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939)? Chevron is the case where the Supreme Court found that the courts, both the Supreme and the inferior courts, should defer to “permissible” agency interpretations of statutes those agencies administer.District of Columbia v. Heller, 467 U.S. 837 (2008).

The Chevron doctrine was another two-step framework. 1) Did Congress directly address the precise question, and was the congressional intent clear? 2) Is the statute silent or ambiguous with the specific issue at hand.

If the answer to both questions was “yes”, then the court was required to defer to the agency administrating the statute.

Like the two-step shuffle of pre-Bruen Second Amendment jurisprudence, the courts always found for the state. Is the puddle in my backyard navigable waters of the United States, as defined in the EPA? Congress did not precisely address puddles, and since this is a dispute, it must be ambiguous. EPA, do you think that puddles in his backyard qualify as navigable waters of the United States?

Well, yes. You see, that water flows into that ditch, that ditch flows into that stream (which is dry 9 out of 12 months), from there it flows into that creek, from there into that river. Rivers are navigable waters and this puddle is connected to it and contributes to it. If the owner of the property were to divert that water, they are effecting the river.

Now, that might sound like a made up example, it is not. It is a case from memory where the EPA took a homeowner to court for violating the Environmental Protection Act because they changed the contours of their backyard to eliminate a soft spot that got yucky a few times a year.

What is Loper
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Rahimi Fallout

There was a reason that the DoJ wanted Rahimi before the Supreme Court. The facts in his case were bad facts. Bad facts lead to bad law.

The first thing to note about the Rahimi opinion, is that it is an “as applied”. This means the opinion only counts for Rahimi. The decision does not directly affect anybody else.

Rahimi claimed that §922(g)(8) was unconstitutional on its face. This requires that there are no circumstances where it could be constitutional. This is an extremely high bar to meet.

This is where the bad facts start. Rahimi was subject to a domestic violence temporary restraining order. This requires that certain requirements be met. As stated in other articles, the law, as written, does not require that the accused receive notification, only that the notification was sent. It does not require that the accused appear at the hearing, only that they have an opportunity to attend.

Rahimi received his notification, appeared in court. This means that the first two, of three requirements are met.

The third requirement, is that the accused be found to be a credible threat.

Rahimi admitted, and the court found, that he was a credible threat.

This meets all three prongs of §922(g)(8)
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