Cases

The GVRs

What is a GVR?

The process for an appeal is to request that a case be heard. When the superior court Grants that appeal, the case is moved to a final opinion. One of the possible outcomes is that the inferior court’s opinion is Vacated.

When an inferior court’s opinion is vacated, the superior court has an option to Remand the case back to the inferior court for a do-over.

When the superior court does this without hearing anything from the parties outside the request to be heard, it is called “GVR”.

If the superior court were to just “GVR” a case, it wouldn’t be helpful to the inferior court. Nobody learns from “You are mistaken, do it over.” There needs to be some level of feedback.

On July 2nd, 2024, the Supreme Court issued their final orders of the 2023 term.

Read More

Harrel v. Raoul, Denial of Certiorari

The State of Illinois enacted a law that makes it a felony to possess what Illinois branded “assault weapons,” a term defined to include AR–15s. See Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 720, §5/24–1.9(a)(1)(J)(ii)(II) (West 2023). “The AR–15 is the most popular semi-automatic rifle” in America and is therefore undeniably “in common use today.” Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F. 3d 1244, 1287 (CADC 2011) (KAVANAUGH, J., dissenting); see also Garland v. Cargill, 602 U. S. 406, 430–431 (2024) (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting) (describing “semiautomatic rifles” such as the AR–15 as “commonly available”). Petitioners sought a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the law, arguing that the law violates their Second Amendment right to “keep and bear Arms.” The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected petitioners’ request for a preliminary injunction, concluding “that the AR–15 … is not protected by the Second Amendment.” Bevis v. Naperville, 85 F. 4th 1175, 1197 (2023). According to the Seventh Circuit, the rifle selected by millions of Americans for self-defense and other lawful purposes does not even fall within the scope of the Arms referred to by the Second Amendment. Ibid. This Court is rightly wary of taking cases in an interlocutory posture. But, I hope we will consider the important issues presented by these petitions after the cases reach final judgment.
Harrel v. Raoul, Denial of Cert, 603 U.S. ____ (2024) Statement of Justice Thomas

We knew that Sotomayor wasn’t the sharpest crayon in the box, I love how Justice Thomas cites to her opinion saying that AR-15s are in common use.

…does not even fall within the scope of …: That should have Easterbrook and Woods looking for a rock to crawl under. That is a strong rebuke, coming from the Supreme Court.

Read More

Immunity for official acts

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR has thoroughly addressed the Court’s flawed reasoning and conclusion as a matter of history, tradition, law, and logic. I agree with every word of her powerful dissent. I write separately to explain, as succinctly as I can, the theoretical nuts and bolts of what, exactly, the majority has done today to alter the paradigm of accountability for Presidents of the United States. I also address what that paradigm shift means for our Nation moving forward.
Harrel v. Raoul, Denial of Cert, 603 U.S. ____ (2024) Justice Jackson, dissenting.

I remember taking some classes back in the olden times, where they described the Republican form of government that was created for these United States. I seem to remember that the federal government was made up of three branches, the legislative branch tasked with creating laws, the executive branch, tasked with implementing those laws and has veto powers over laws passed by the legislative branch, and the judicial branch, tasked with resolving disputes about the meaning of the laws.

If the President decides that a bill that has passed congress is unacceptable, he can veto that bill. If congress strongly disagrees with his opinion, they can override that veto.

Once the bill has become law, the President, as head of the executive branch, implements the law.

If there are any disputes about the law, that goes before the judiciary for their opinion.

Read More

Chevron is dead, long live Loper

Just what is —Harrel v. Raoul, Denial of Cert, 603 U.S. ____ (2024)? Chevron is the case where the Supreme Court found that the courts, both the Supreme and the inferior courts, should defer to “permissible” agency interpretations of statutes those agencies administer.id..

The Chevron doctrine was another two-step framework. 1) Did Congress directly address the precise question, and was the congressional intent clear? 2) Is the statute silent or ambiguous with the specific issue at hand.

If the answer to both questions was “yes”, then the court was required to defer to the agency administrating the statute.

Like the two-step shuffle of pre-Bruen Second Amendment jurisprudence, the courts always found for the state. Is the puddle in my backyard navigable waters of the United States, as defined in the EPA? Congress did not precisely address puddles, and since this is a dispute, it must be ambiguous. EPA, do you think that puddles in his backyard qualify as navigable waters of the United States?

Well, yes. You see, that water flows into that ditch, that ditch flows into that stream (which is dry 9 out of 12 months), from there it flows into that creek, from there into that river. Rivers are navigable waters and this puddle is connected to it and contributes to it. If the owner of the property were to divert that water, they are effecting the river.

Now, that might sound like a made up example, it is not. It is a case from memory where the EPA took a homeowner to court for violating the Environmental Protection Act because they changed the contours of their backyard to eliminate a soft spot that got yucky a few times a year.

What is Loper
Read More

Rahimi Fallout

There was a reason that the DoJ wanted Rahimi before the Supreme Court. The facts in his case were bad facts. Bad facts lead to bad law.

The first thing to note about the Rahimi opinion, is that it is an “as applied”. This means the opinion only counts for Rahimi. The decision does not directly affect anybody else.

Rahimi claimed that §922(g)(8) was unconstitutional on its face. This requires that there are no circumstances where it could be constitutional. This is an extremely high bar to meet.

This is where the bad facts start. Rahimi was subject to a domestic violence temporary restraining order. This requires that certain requirements be met. As stated in other articles, the law, as written, does not require that the accused receive notification, only that the notification was sent. It does not require that the accused appear at the hearing, only that they have an opportunity to attend.

Rahimi received his notification, appeared in court. This means that the first two, of three requirements are met.

The third requirement, is that the accused be found to be a credible threat.

Rahimi admitted, and the court found, that he was a credible threat.

This meets all three prongs of §922(g)(8)
Read More

PICA motion for Certiorari pending(?)

The Harrel v. Raoul case is one of the many challenges to the Illinois PICA act. It is grouped with other PICA challenges.

For the last 6 Fridays, the case has been distributed for Conference. On the following Monday, the Supreme Court issues their orders. For 6 weeks, the case has been redistributed for Conference the following Friday.

Today’s order list is out. They did not grant nor did they deny cert.

They also did not Distribute for Conference on 2024-06-28. That could just be normal holiday behavior, but something different happened.

Justice Jackson

I’ve noticed that she likes to write her own little pieces. Almost as if she wanted the attention.

One of my favorite Jackson statements was something similar to “that would make it too hard for the government.”

This case tests our Second Amendment jurisprudence as shaped in particular by New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U. S. 1 (2022). I disagree with the methodology of that decision; I would have joined the dissent had I been a Member of the Court at that time. See generally id., at 83–133 (Breyer, J., dissenting). But Bruen is now binding law. Today’s decision fairly applies that precedent, so I join the opinion in full.
Harrel v. Raoul, Denial of Cert, 603 U.S. ____ (2024)

It is always nice when a Justice tells us they are biased. She thinks she is better than those that who sat for Bruen. Regardless, even she agrees that Bruen affirming Heller is binding law. No two-step shuffle anymore. No interest balancing. The weakest Justice on the court sees it, so to should inferior courts.

I write separately because we now have two years’ worth of post-Bruen cases under our belts, and the experiences of courts applying its history-and-tradition test should bear on our assessment of the workability of that legal standard. This case highlights the apparent difficulty faced by judges on the ground. Make no mistake: Today’s effort to clear up “misunderst[andings],” ante, at 7, is a tacit admission that lower courts are struggling. In my view, the blame may lie with us, not with them.
id.

The apparent difficulty that she is seeing is inferior courts attempting to circumvent the clear instructions in Bruen. Is it an arm? Does somebody want to keep or bear it? The Second Amendment’s plain text is implicated. The burden shifts to the state.

This isn’t difficult. Any judge or lawyer that wasn’t result/agenda driven could see that.

“It’s too hard!” they scream. Yes, it is too difficult to infringe on The People and not sound like a pretzel maker.

They are struggling because they lost the game. The two-step shuffle of deciding how much she was raped, and then deciding if the rapist (state) had a good enough reason for raping. She wasn’t wearing a full-body sack, she forced that rapist to rape her.
Read More

Rahimi, Justice Thomas Dissenting

This opinion is 103 pages long with the court’s opinion, delivered by Chief Justice Roberts joined by Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson. Sotomayor wrote a concurring opinion, Kagan joined in that concurrence. Gorsuch wrote a concurrence. Kavanaugh wrote a concurrence. Barrett wrote a concurrence. Jackson blathered some words, pretending to agree.

And Justice Clearance Thomas stood up and said, “You got it wrong.”

After New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), this Court’s directive was clear: A firearm regulation that falls within the Second Amendment’s plain text is unconstitutional unless it is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. Not a single historical regulation justifies the statute at issue, 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(8). Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
Harrel v. Raoul, Denial of Cert, 603 U.S. ____ (2024)

This is where I stand as well. The state failed to meet its burden to show that §922(g)(8) is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearms regulation. What seems to have happened is that they were looking hard for something that would allow them to ignore the precedents of Heller and Bruen

Just as important as §922(g)(8)’s express terms is what it leaves unsaid. Section 922(g)(8) does not require a finding that a person has ever committed a crime of domestic violence. It is not triggered by a criminal conviction or a person’s criminal history, unlike other §922(g) subsections. See §§922(g)(1), (9). And, §922(g)(8) does not distinguish contested orders from joint orders—for example, when parties voluntarily enter a no-contact agreement or when both parties seek a restraining order.
id.

I haven’t really seen a historical firearm regulation that actually allows for the disarmament of a person. I’m not sure that Justice Thomas would agree.

This case isn’t about a criminal being disarmed. This case is about a man in the middle of divorce proceedings where he was slapped with a TRO. We don’t even know if he had affective counsel. We don’t know if he was in attendance during the hearing.

All we know is that the court believes he received actual notice and that he was allowed to participate. Not that he actually received notice or that he participated.

Short story, when I was divorcing my first wife, it was not a good thing. She was looking for ways of messing with me. I arrived to pick up my kids for the Memorial Day weekend. My kids and I had made plans. She refused to answer the door.

In the end, she came downstairs and we spoke. I backed away from her. Kept my hands in my pockets. Left without my children.

I called my Lawyer, reported the entire incident. Told my lawyer to be on the lookout for a simple assault charge. My lawyer called the ex’s lawyer to make sure he knew that we were ready for that charge if it was filed.

The ex’s lawyer swore up and down that there were no charges, no complaint filed.

About a month later, the cops showed up in mass to arrest me. Failure to appear.

My lovely estranged wife had managed to fill out the complaint so badly that they sent the summons to the wrong county. I never received it.

The court didn’t care. They had put it in the mail, it was my responsibility to know that they had.

If my Ex had been looking for a TRO when they held that hearing, I would have “failed to appear” but I would have been “given notice” and “had an opportunity to appear”.

In addition, §922(g)(8) requires that the TRO restrain the accused from engaging in threatening behavior. Here’s the thing, being told “don’t threaten your wife” does not mean that you have ever threatened your wife. The defense and many of the Amici pointed out that the “don’t threaten” language is often just boilerplate stuff.

This is much different from being found guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, in a court of law, by a jury of your peers.

The Second Amendment provides that “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” As the Court recognizes, Bruen provides the framework for analyzing whether a regulation such as §922(g)(8) violates the Second Amendment’s mandate. “[W]hen the Second Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct.” 597 U.S., at 17. To overcome this presumption, “the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Ibid. The presumption against restrictions on keeping and bearing firearms is a central feature of the Second Amendment. That Amendment does not merely narrow the Government’s regulatory power. It is a barrier, placing the right to keep and bear arms off limits to the Government.
id.

Damn, just damn.

So this is where we start to see how come Justice Thomas is so good for us. One of the arguments that the state makes, over and over again, is that this particular infringement addresses a new societal problem or advancement in technology, and therefore, the court should use a “more nuanced approach” in matching historical regulations.

The Court employed this “straightforward” analysis in Heller and Bruen. Heller considered the District of Columbia’s “flat ban on the possession of handguns in the home,” Bruen, 597 U. S., at 27, and Bruen considered New York’s effective ban on carrying a firearm in public, see id., at 11–13. The Court determined that the District of Columbia and New York had “addressed a perceived societal problem—firearm violence in densely populated communities—and [they] employed a regulation … that the Founders themselves could have adopted to confront that problem.” Id., at 27. Accordingly, the Court “consider[ed] ‘founding-era historical precedent’” and looked for a comparable regulation. Ibid. (quoting Heller, 554 U. S., at 631). In both cases, the Court found no such law and held the modern regulations unconstitutional. Id., at 631; Bruen, 597 U. S., at 27.
Missing citations for UETRMP2L

This paragraph guts all those state arguments. Any weapons ban is “straightforward” under Bruen and Heller

Section 922(g)(8) violates the Second Amendment. First, it targets conduct at the core of the Second Amendment—possessing firearms. Second, the Government failed to produce any evidence that §922(g)(8) is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. To the contrary, the founding generation addressed the same societal problem as §922(g)(8) through the “materially different means” of surety laws. Id., at 26.
Missing citations for UETRMP2L

The state has been arguing that surety laws allow them to ban classes of firearms, or make an area a sensitive location. It is not clear from the record that surety laws were used as much as just existing.

In this case, Thomas matches the surety laws to the regulation in question. Is that person violent? Have him put up a sum of money which will be forfeit if he does violence. This is a good match.

There is much more to get from this dissent. I’m sure there will be more soon.

Rahimi

Short of it,

Chief Justice Roberts wrote the opinion of the court.  It seems very narrowly crafted.  It is not a loss for the Second Amendment Community.

Held: When an individual has been found by a court to pose a credible threat to the physical safety of another, that individual  may be temporarily disarmed consistent with the Second Amendment

Rahimi 602 U.S. ____ (2024)

Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion with Kagan.  Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson filed concurring opinions. Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.