Cases

Wolford v. Lopez

In this analysis, I’m not going to be doing as much quoting. There are others that do so. Instead, I’m going to attempt to distill the argument or line of questioning.

Alan A. Beck, lawyer for the good guy

The Second Amendment is implicated. Hawaii has not met its burden to prove there is a historical tradition of firearms regulation that matches this law. This is a presumptive ban on The People’s right to bear arms, even if not stated explicitly.

Thomas: You argue that the law prevents access to about 97% of public areas? how did you arrive at that?

Beck: The entire package of laws is 96.4%, this law is less. We got that value from an architecture firm that went through public records of the County of Maui.

Sotomayor (interrupting Thomas): It’s not really 97%, right? This law is much less than that. People can carry in other places, Right?

All right. So you say that there is a constitutional right to carry a gun on private property?

Beck: Yes.

Sotomayor: I’ve never seen that right. I mean, I understand that there is a right to carry a gun on private property with an owner’s consent, express or implicit, correct?

Me: I did read it in the Constitution: the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. And she just said it, she gave it away. You have that right if you have the right to carry on public property if you have the owner’s express or implicit consent. And that is what property open to the public means: you have explicit consent to enter, and you have the implicit consent to carry.

The state of Hawaii removes that implicit consent to carry.

Sotomayor then goes on to try to conflate carrying where you are legally allowed to go with trespass. It is difficult to follow because she wants it to be difficult to follow. She is attempting to make the case about property rights. Which is not at question.

Nobody is arguing that private property owners can forbid trespass and can set rules for entering their property. “No shoes, no shirt, no service” is exactly that. A “No Guns” sign means I’m shopping somewhere else.

She then goes on to yap about the “custom” of carrying on private property with implied consent. She then pulls a quick one by trying to say that since Hawaii has a 200 year custom of forbidding firearms, this is the custom that should stand now. Beck fires back that it is a “custom of the nation”, not the state. Falling into her verbal trap.

There are no laws in this Nation’s historical tradition of firearms regulation that takes away that implied consent.

Sotomayor and Beck get into a back and forth regarding a previous Supreme Court case, McKee. Sotomayor claims it was talking about the customs of just the state of Missouri, while Beck points out that Justice Scalia used the term “Nation” multiple times. I’ll take Beck’s word over the second dumbest justice to sit on the Supreme Court.

She then tries to bring in laws from 1721, 1722. There’s a huge issue with this. The laws of 1721, 1722 are the laws of England, not this Nation.
Even if the laws were applicable, they all dwelt with closed lands. Lands that were not open to the public.

Barrett and Beck agree that Hawaii could pass a law that prohibited carrying on closed lands as a property right.

Dumber (Jackson) now opens her mouth. Justice Thomas takes off his glasses, leans back in his chair and waits for the magpie to stop making noise.

This is just a property right issue. Property rights trump Second Amendment rights.

Beck calls her BS saying the issue implicates the right to keep and bear arms. Jackson says it doesn’t. It is just property rights.

Gorsuch: This law destroys the right to bear arms in Hawaii. Where does this fit into the Bruen framework?

Beck: Carrying is implicated by this law. The burden must shift to state to prove a match with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearms regulation.

Sotomayor: So the 96% doesn’t really matter? There’s no means end scrutiny? Hawaii has a right to regulate a custom. That means the Second Amendment isn’t implicated.

Using a 1763 for the colony of New York, they banned trespass on private land; that means Hawaii can ban carry on public land.

Sotomayor’s method is to talk over, to interrupt the lawyers she disagrees with. She doesn’t listen to what Beck has to say.

She is actually doing performative art. She and Jackson are both saying things that can be quoted later and which they will quote in their dissent about why this was wrongly decided.

Sotomayor ran this guy out of time. And even when Chief Justice Roberts says he is out of time, Sotomayor talks over Roberts for another paragraph or two. Beck tries to answer; Sotomayor cuts him off before Roberts cuts Sotomayor’s line of questioning off.

Roberts uses a gas station and a home on the side of the road to highlight that there is a difference between private property closed to the public and private property open to the public. Beck does a fantastic job of pointing out that all other rights extend to the door. As Roberts says, “A stranger can walk off the sidewalk and go up to the door?” Beck, “Yes, up to the door, Your Honor”

Alito asks if there are any other objects besides guns that a person may not possess when they enter private property open to the public.

Sotomayor goes back to the Hawaii custom of denying rights to prove that they should still be able to deny The People the right to keep and bear arms.

And she is snarky about it; it looks like she yanks some number out of her ass: So 78 percent of Hawaii residents and 64 percent of Hawaii gun owners do not think that loaded concealed weapons should be allowed into businesses at all, correct?

Beck: I’m unaware of that statistic, Your Honor.

Sotomayor: “I wasn’t aware of your 97 — 96 point — percent number”

She would have been aware of his numbers if she had read the fillings. Thomas knew. Thomas mentioned it, not Beck.

Kagan: Hasn’t the state met its burden with the many historical regulations it has cited? And they have multiple references to legislation that flipped the default.

Beck: No. The poaching laws limited carrying on private lands for poaching, not for self-defense. The other laws cited are black code laws. Laws designed to discriminate against blacks. We’ve moved past that.

Kagan: Well, yes, they are anti-pouching laws, and yes, they did allow people to carry for self-defense, but that is close enough to banning armed self-defense on private property, right?

Kagan: You see, the anti-poaching laws were about preventing injuries to private property, and Hawaii’s law is about preventing injuries also.

Me: No, anti-poaching laws were to stop people from stealing food on the hoof.

Beck: This entire line of questioning is irrelevant. The laws you are referring to were closed property; Hawaii’s law is for property open to the public.

Gorsuch: The laws being referenced are a New Jersey 1771 anti-poaching law. The other is an 1865 Louisiana law that a Reconstruction governor explained was aimed at the freedmen. A black code law. Do you think that black codes should inform our decision-making?

Beck: Hell no.

Gorsuch: Well, the state claims it is a dead ringer for this statute.

Beck: The 1865 law was expressly passed to discriminate against African Americans that were newly freed slaves. And I just don’t see how a law like that can be used to be analogized to a modern-day law, this modern-day law, Your Honor.

Barrett asks if Beck agrees with everything the government said in their brief. Beck thinks she is talking about the state of Hawaii. Barrett clarifies that she is speaking of the US federal government, which filed supporting The People and will be arguing next. Beck corrects himself and there is a bunch of laughter.

Barrett: The government that’s on your same side.

Beck: Yes, I understand.

(Laughter.)

Beck: I agree with every —

Barrett: I’m not asking you to throw your case away.

(Laughter.)

Beck: I fully endorse the United States’ brief, Your Honor.

Barrett asks for clarification regarding “open to public” and “closed to public” and the 1865 black code law. Beck replies that there might be something to discuss there, but the fact that it is a black code law means it is not part of this Nation’s historical tradition of firearms regulation.

Jackson is back for another whiff at bat: Chief Justice Roberts asked about a gas station on the side of the road. We don’t get to enter that gas station because of a Constitutional right but because the owner of the gas station has given us consent. That consent has limits, and the owner can set those limits, and the state can set limits, right?

Beck: You have a constitutional right to carry your firearm onto that specific gas station.

Good going, Mr. Beck. Don’t let Jackson distract you.

Goodness, is Jackson dumb or just incompetent? She is attempting to set a word trap, and she’s nowhere near as good as Sotomayor, and Sotomayor is bad at it. She denies there is a constitutional right to carry on private property. She then says that there is an implied license. Then claims that there is a historical tradition of requiring a license to enter private property.

This is so convoluted. Nowhere do you need a “license” to enter private property. She is using an obsolete definition where “license” is the same as “permission”. She then continues to use the term “license” to say that you require a license to enter. This type of language will be used in the dissent to justify Hawaii’s licensing (permission) scheme.

Cringe warning

Jackson:

Let me just ask you about the black codes. Justice Gorsuch raised it. And I guess what I’m wondering — your answer to him was they can’t be and shouldn’t be used.

And I guess I’m wondering whether that doesn’t signal a problem with the Bruen test, that to the extent that we have a test that relates to historical regulation, but all of the history of regulation is not taken into account, I — I think there might be something wrong with the test. So can you speak to that?

(I had to take a break after that.)

She goes on, saying that when Thomas wrote “this Nation’s historical tradition of firearms regulations” he said that we were bound by history. Since 1865 is part of our history, then that should be part of the Bruen test. Which also means that any law ever passed becomes part of our history and thus becomes justification for all future infringements, even if that law is later struck down.

Ms. Harris is the Principal Deputy Solicitor General for the Federal DOJ. She was acting solicitor general before D. John Sauer was confirmed as solicitor general. She is now the second in command of the office of the solicitor general. John Sauer was presenting on a different case the day this case was argued.

In other words, she’s way the heck up there. Trump->Pam Bondi->John Sauer->Ms. Harris. And she’s arguing for us!

Harris: Hawaii is lying about why they passed this law. It is aimed at only legal gun owners with CCWs. There are no other items these laws affect. Besides, the only law they can use to support their current law is an unconstitutional black code.

There is back and forth regarding pretextual laws. The example given is of English game laws. These laws were to “preserve game” but were designed to prevent commoners from hunting.

The gist is that when looking for an analog firearm regulation, the real reason is looked at, not the pretext. Hawaii says it is protecting property rights for safety reasons. Just because they say it is for safety and property rights doesn’t mean that laws dealing with property rights and safety are a match to this law.

You have to look for the true reason for the law. In this case, the vampire laws are designed to keep people from carrying because there are too many places where it is illegal.

Kagan opines that The Court doesn’t look at the motives a law was passed. Harris fires back that if the stated purpose and the text show a fundamental mismatch, it belies the asserted motive of the legislature.

Kagan says The Court can’t do that because that would be means-ends scrutiny.

It is clear that the three crones of the Supreme Court are trying to neuter Bruen.

Kavanaugh has had enough of this.

Why are we making it complicated? The text of the Second Amendment covers arms.

Part 3 of Heller says that means what it — Heller says it means what it says, says what it means. Part 3 of Heller says there are certain exceptions to that or contours on that which are rooted, but they have to be rooted in history.

Here, there’s no sufficient history supporting the regulation, end of case.

Isn’t that kind of the straightforward way rather than getting into this whole new elaborate pretext analysis, which, as Justice Kagan says, sounds like what we moved away from?

Harris: Absolutely!

This is a trap that “smart” people fall into. They get distracted by the details. Instead of focusing on the big picture, they get lost in the weeds, and then instead of deciding based on the big picture, they end in a major fight over details.

Harris is fighting a different battle here, though. She is fighting to make it clear that doing an end run around the limits the Supreme Court sets out is not acceptable to the United States. She is clearly targeting New York, California, and the rest of the states that had Bruen tantrum response bills.

Kavanaugh is say to keep it simple. Hawaii didn’t meet their burden. Done and done.

Gorsuch brings up First Amendment case law that addressed a similar issue. Harris uses Lamont as her example. In Lamont they flipped the script on mail delivery. The rule was that you got mail of all sorts unless you explicitly said “no”. The law in question in Lamont flipped it to require a person to explicitly request mail on a “very easy-to-send postcard”. This was firmly rejected by The Court.

Jackson is back with another attempt to make this only about property rights. Harris gives a perfect example of how stupid this argument is. She points out that today a politician can have somebody come to your door to campaign. But if this law was followed in a First Amendment situation, the homeowner would have to post a large sign on their property before that door knock could take place.

Alito sends a soft pitch asking about why antipoaching laws are not an appropriate analogue. Harris knocks it out of the park. You know why.

Alito then asks what is the purpose of the Second Amendment right is. Harris, self-defense, and other lawful purposes.

Alito focuses on Heller, which he wrote, to point out that the wording was about self-defense but that other lawful purposes also existed. Harris does a good job in the answers.

Sotomayor is back. Still attempting to make it all about property rights and the owner’s consent. She tries to use Hawaii’s tradition of screwing over The People’s right to keep and bear arms over the last 200 years as the tradition that allows Hawaii to pass the vampire laws.

Harris fires back, stating clearly that local customs in a state doesn’t allow that state to have its own Second Amendment. The meaning of the Second Amendment doesn’t change as you move from state to state.

Ok, this is good!

Harris:

It is 2026 and it is somewhat astonishing that black codes, which are unconstitutional, are being offered as evidence of what our tradition of constitutionally permissible firearm regulation looks like.

Those laws are dead ringers only in the sense that this law too is an unconstitutional pretext. The black codes were offered, as you mentioned, by states before their readmission to the union. It is not an indictment of the Bruen framework to say that unconstitutional laws do not count in illuminating a valid tradition.

It is almost as if Harris had this response lined up before it was asked. Great response.

In an interesting exchange between Kavanaugh and Harris, Kavanaugh asks about sensitive places as mentioned in Heller. He attempts to get Harris to agree with Heller as is. Instead, Harris goes with, We agree with the principle as stated that there are obviously sensitive places. You determine them with respect to the history of firearm regulation.

This is a massive statement by the DoJ. It says they are not arguing that sensitive places do exist, but that it isn’t as easy as saying, “That’s a sensitive place,” to get guns banned. You can’t declare the island of Manhattan a sensitive place. So New York declared Times Square a sensitive place.

Barrett asks about anti-poaching regulations. Harris points out that poaching was and is a problem.

In my state, and most states that I know, you have to post your land to keep hunters out. Hunters are presumed to be able to hunt on any land that is not posted. In my state the limit on where you hunt is 100 yards of an occupied dwelling. And they mean occupied as people living in, not that nobody is home.

JUSTICE JACKSON: So I guess I really don’t understand your response to Justice Gorsuch on the black codes. And here I thought that Jackson had gotten her “I don’t understand” under control. There is so much she doesn’t understand.

She’s arguing that black code laws, laws that have been found unconstitutional, can be used to justify more unconstitutional laws.

More tomorrow.

Gardner v. Maryland

The process to get a case to the Supreme Court is difficult and expensive. For Eva Marie Gardner, she has done it with no visible help.

In January 2021, Eva Gardner was driving her car on I-270 in Maryland. This expressway extends out of D.C. to Frederick, MD. From there it is just a short distance into PA. It is one of the feeder highways for people that work in D.C. but who can’t afford to live in or near D.C.

While driving, an unlicensed driver “forced” her off the road with the use of a “PIT” maneuver. Both the other driver and Ms. Gardner exited their vehicles. Ms. Gardner stated that she displayed her handgun to deter him.

When the cops arrived, the alleged assailant spoke to them comely. The assailant was unable to provide a valid driver’s license, “proof of car ownership” which I take to mean registration, nor proof of insurance. Note, Maryland is a state that requires you to have car insurance.

Having listened to the two parties, the police let the alleged assailant depart, never to be heard from again. They arrested Ms. Gardner for violation of Maryland Criminal Law § 5-203, carrying a firearm without a Maryland permit.

She would have had an attorney for her criminal trial. She then went through the appeals process pro se, meaning without a lawyer, representing herself.

She had a valid Virginia CCW. If I’m reading her petition correctly, PA doesn’t recognize her VA permit either.

How common is this?

This type of case happens way to often. I refer to the state south of me as “Mordor.” If I were to accidentally carry a shell casing into that state, I would be committing a felony under MA state law. You are required to have a permit to own ammunition or ammunition components, much less an actual firearm.

Post Bruen, it takes around 9 months to get a non-resident CCW, which includes in person interviews.

People violating reciprocity laws is very common. There is a mall that is famous among CCW holders; there are parts of the mall that exist in freedom and others where you are subject to the crown of MA. You can be walking through a store, legally carrying your firearm, take a step over and suddenly you have committed a felony.

There is a scene in the movie Sergeant York where he is at the bar, orders a drink, and goes to sit down with it. The barkeep stops him because he would have crossed the county line into a dry county. He could drink whiskey all day long on one side of the room, but not the other.

That is what it is like. There is no path you can take out of VT, NH, and ME where you don’t have to pass through a gun hating state. MA to the south, NY to the west, and Canada to the north.

I would guess this sort of violation of imaginary lines on a map happens 1000s of times a day.

What makes this case interesting?

Absolutely nothing. This was a pro se case. The Supreme Court sees hundreds, if not a few thousand, pro se cases a year. Most are submitted by jailhouse lawyers. Most are summarily denied cert.

Ms. Gardner is likely a felon for this single stop. She’s no different from all the rest.

The case is so uninteresting that the state of Maryland officially declined to submit a response. This was submitted on an editable PDF. In other words, they couldn’t be bothered to even type something up. Somebody filled in the blanks in the PDF and sent it off.

The petition for writ of certiorari was filed on 2025/10/22. Maryland said “Not interested” on 2025/11/03. The case was distributed for conference 3 days later. (That’s fast).

On 2025/11/12 the Supreme Court “requested” a response from Maryland by 2025/12/12.

On 2025/11/19 the panic had set in. Maryland asked for a 45 day extension, claiming they had not looked at the case and were busy with 7 other important cases, two of which were also Second Amendment Cases.

The extension was granted.

Yes, the Supreme Court told the country, “Pay attention to this case”.

That simple request set the wheels in motion. The request was picked up in the weekly orders. People said, “Huh, what case is this?” and looked it up.

What happened?

Word got out in the Second Amendment legal community. Washington Gun Law mentioned it, then did a video on it. So did Mark Smith and a few others.

This means that on 2025/12/11 the first of the reinforcements showed up.

First up was the Second Amendment Foundation with NRA backing via the California Rifle & Pistol Association (CRPA) and more. The basic argument is that this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation made exceptions for travelers when travelers were in locations demanding permitting or licensing.

The Heller Foundation points out that Supreme Court precedents permit only modest, ministerial burdens on visitors. Maryland’s “preclearance regime” is not modest. They point out that Maryland is forcing travelers to forgo one right for another. And that Maryland’s regime is an outlier.

Thank all the constitutional carry states for that bit.

Ted Cruz and his fellow Senators spoke up. Their contribution might be the better statement of the question. It will be interesting to see what the question SCOTUS presents when they grant cert.

This brief focuses on errors in the inferior courts opinions. The inferior courts used footnote 9 from Bruen.

The Cato Institute hammers on the right to travel is a constitutionally protected right. You have to either give up your right to travel or your right to armed self-defense.

Virginia, New Hampshire, and 22 other states provided their input as well.

A core principle of our federal system is that federal constitutional rights do not change when travelling between the several States. See U.S. Const. art. VI. Just as the Fourth Amendment protects every American’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures in both Nebraska and California, or the First Amendment protects every American’s right to speak freely in both Delaware and Louisiana, the Second Amendment protects every American’s right to carry firearms for self-defense in both Virginia and Maryland.

Maryland has chosen to ignore that cornerstone of constitutional federalism by prosecuting a law-abiding Virginia citizen for possessing a loaded firearm and displaying it to deter an assailant. Worse, Maryland’s basis for the prosecution was a concededly unconstitutional may-issue licensing regime. Applying this unconstitutional licensing regime to a Virginia citizen with a valid Virginia concealed carry license merely because she was attacked in Maryland flaunts this Court’s precedents and basic constitutional principles. Maryland may not require Virginia citizens to obtain a speech license—granted only to those espousing Maryland-approved viewpoints—before speaking. Similarly, it cannot require Virginia citizens to undergo an unconstitutional licensing process before carrying firearms for self-defense.

What are we hoping for?

First, we are hoping that this case does not become an as applied opinion. We want the case to be granted cert and for The Court to find that CCWs are just like driver’s licenses. It doesn’t matter which state issues your license; it is good in all states.

When you add Constitutional Carry to the mix, this means that citizens of half the states in the Union would be able to carry anywhere in the states with just proof of residence in their home state.

This might also be a stepping stone for ending the bs about buying firearms out of state.

SCOTUS – It’s Complicated, Trump v. Illinois

Many years ago my mentor explained to me how the director of the lab had almost gotten himself in trouble. The sort of trouble that ends with “I hereby sentence you to X years.” All because he failed to honor the color of money.

“Color of money” is a term of art within some parts of the government. In this case the lab had a considerable budget. They had been authorized by Congress to purchase a supercomputer. They ordered the supercomputer but were told it would be a while to get it. “A while” was measured in quarters.

The lab needed a supercomptuter now. They were offered a different model that could be delivered and set up within a couple of months.

This is what they decided to do. The problem was they required a few million dollars to buy this second supercomputer. This required another authorization from Congress.

The request was put in, money was coming, it would be there in just a few weeks.

The issue?

That second computer was very popular. There were other people who had cash now to buy it.

The lab director decided he used money that he was authorized to spend to buy the supercomputer. That money was marked (colored) for a different use later in the year.

A few weeks later, Congress authorized money for the second supercomputer, and all the accounts balanced perfectly.

The issue? Using the wrong colored money was technically not allowed. It was the sort of thing that gets you jail time if the powers that be decide they don’t like you.

It appears that this is what happened to Trump

the President relied on 10 U.S.C. §12406(3)

This statue has specific language: unable with the regular forces to execute the laws of the United States..

And that is what happened. The government argues that “the regular forces” means regular federal employees and law enforcement. The courts are saying that “the regular forces” means the military.

Since the administration did not argue that they could not take care of the problem by deploying the U.S. Marines, they had not met the requirement of “unable with the regular forces”.

Now this is where it gets interesting. The court did not address the question of “Can the administration deploy regular forces?”

The Posse Comitatus Act forbids deploying regular forces to enforce laws except under certain circumstances.

But, as Justice Kavanaugh pointed out, there are other statutes the administration can use to authorize the deployment of “the regular forces”.

In other words, it looks like the city of Chicago is about to get what they asked for, good and hard.

Lawfair – Matt Hoover

This poor dude was run through the system, chewed up and finally spat out. He was released to a halfway house yesterday.

What was his huge crime?

He gave the middle finger to the ATF.

There is a gizmo called a Lightning Link. This thing is supposed to function like an autosear in an AR-15. They were never very reliable and were offered more as a proof of concept than anything else. These are not drop-in autosears.

A drop-in autosear functions to carry a regular autosear but without a need for the third hole. They work well when they are a quality build.

The thing about the autosear is that very few of them were registered as machineguns. This was a $5-10 part that required a $200 transfer stamp.

There are likely no registered Lightning Links because they work so poorly that it is unlikely that anybody registered a $1 junk part, if it even had a serial number.

Matt Hoover had a semi-popular YouTube channel. He was making money from his channel. Somebody contacted him from Wisconsin, if memory serves, and together they came up with a thump nose at ATF plan.

To have a better understanding, understand that cryptographic “stuff” is or used to be an “arm” under export control. The same as an M1 tank. Exporting a cryptographic device would land you in jail, for a long time.

When RSA was first published, there was no issue. It was First Amendment protected to publish the RSA algorithm. The same is true with DES, IDEA, BlowFish, and later, AES. These were all protected speech.

What wasn’t protected, was software implementing them. The government ignored this for the most part until Pretty Good Privacy, or PGP.

This changed the game, in the mind of the government.

The idea behind PGP was that you would use public key cryptography, in the form of RSA keys, to encrypt a small block of information. That block would contain the actual cryptographic key to decrypt the rest of the message.

This means that people can publish their public key with no fear. You can publish it in a newspaper or any web page. Anybody can then send you a message that could not be decrypted except by the person with the matching private key.

To get PGP out of the country legally, they printed it in an OCR font and just walked through customs with a printed book. The book was fully protected by the First Amendment. Once in a country that had more reasonable cryptographic export laws, development continued.

Matt Hoover and his partner decided to use the same idea. Instead of an “Arm” as defined by export law, they would print a “machine gun” as defined by the NFA.

They contracted to have a credit card sized piece of stainless-steel laser etched with an image of a Lightning Link. Except they were going to play it safe.

When the manufacturer suggested they etch the image deep enough that the pieces could be “popped out”, they refused. This was just an etching.

What came out later is that they didn’t even get the dimensions right. Again, this was intentional. If you were to actually cut the pieces out of that card, they would not create a functional device.

There was no way to make that piece of stainless-steel into a Lightning Link without extensive machining and other information.

In other words, it was no better than an expensive piece of stainless-steel.

Matt and his partner were charged with distributing machine guns; they were found guilty, and both were sentenced to prison.

Matt has cancer and has been given a compassionate release, if I understand the reports correctly.

So two dudes who were exercising their free speech rights, thumping their noses at the ATF, found out that the ATF has no sense of humor and were sentenced to prison for a crime they did not commit.

Oh, what was the proof of them selling machine guns? The ATF lab destroyed multiple autolink cards before they managed to get a modified AR-15 to malfunction. They got a second shot when the hammer followed the bolt down and fired the second round.

This could not be made to happen in any reliable way. In other words, they broke an AR and claimed it was a machine gun.

U.S. v. Hemani 24-1234

This is another Rahimi in the making. In Rahimi, The People didn’t lose, but our win was limited. Chief Justice Roberts wrote the opinion, leaving weasel words for the infringers to use against us.

The often quoted statement in the legal business is, “Bad facts make bad law.”

The Fact Pattern

From the indictment:

On or about August 3, 2022, in Denton County, in the Eastern District of Texas Ali Danial Hemani, defendant, knowing that he was an unlawful user of a controlled substance as defined in Title 21 United States Code, Section 802, did knowingly possess a firearm, that is, a Glock 19, 9mm pistol, bearing serial number BRWX640, said firearm having been shipped and transported in interstate and foreign commerce.

In violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) and 924(a)(8).
United States v. Hemani, 4:23-cr-00018, (E.D. Tex. Feb 08, 2023) ECF No. 1

This is it. He was arrested and charged under 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(3) because a search of his parents’ home found pot and a handgun in his possession.

The state explained the search this way:

In April and October of 2021, downloads of Hemani’s phone revealed that he was abusing controlled substances including promethazine. Specifically, in one conversation Hemani texted another individual and discussed the purchase and sale of bottles of promethazine from different suppliers. Hemani stated that he had three bottles to sell and needed clients in high end areas around Dallas. In another conversation, Hemani stated that he had purchased five bottles of promethazine and offered to sell one bottle for $120. He further stated that he had started “sipping” from his other source of supply and noted that “this shits too addicting” and “idk if I want to stop.” A search warrant executed on August 3, 2022 at the residence Hemani shared with his parents resulted in the location and seizure of cocaine, marijuana, and two firearms. One of the firearms. a Glock handgun registered to Hemani, was found in Hemani’s bedroom. Hemani confessed that he had purchased the 4.7 grams of cocaine that was found in his mother’s room three to four months earlier. He further admitted that he purchased cocaine one to two times a year and smoked marijuana every other day. He added that he kept a quarter ounce of marijuana in his car or hidden at home and that he purchased large quantities of drugs which he would split with his friends.

At the time of the search and at the time of his arrest, Hemani was not under the influence.
United States v. Hemani, 4:23-cr-00018, (E.D. Tex. Feb 23, 2023) ECF No. 18

It is important to note that promethazine is not a controlled substance. It is a prescription-only drug. IANAL, I have no idea how that relates to buying and selling controlled substances or things like cocaine.

It looks like his family were mild drug users. Cocaine and marijuana being their drugs of choice.

The statement “Hemani confessed that he had purchased the 4.7 grams of cocaine that was found…” may not be a fact in evidence. As far as I can tell, none of this statement has been determined to be factual, but, again, I am not a lawyer.

The state goes on to say that only “law-abiding” citizens are part of The People protected by the Second Amendment. This is a moronic take on Heller and Bruen. Rahimi had not been decided at the time of this filing. If Rahimi had been decided, the fact that Mr. Rahimi, a bad, bad man, was still considered to be part of The People protected by the Second Amendment would hold in this case.

Even though the state claims that Mr. Hemani is not a part of The People, they then say that the standard litany of “in the terror” and “while intoxicated” and other safety regulations are a match.

Here is the interesting thing: in the state’s entire section on meeting their burden of proving a match to this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation, they did not cite a single firearm regulation. They didn’t cite a single regulation.

Instead they cited books of “expert” opinions. This does not count towards meeting their burden.

The Defense

Mr. Hemani filed a motion to dismiss the charges in an as-applied and facial challenge to §922(g)(3) as a violation of his Second Amendment protected rights. He also challenged under the Fifth Amendment on a vagueness claim.

The magistrate judge in the case heard the argument to dismiss and wrote a recommendation to the court.

The magistrate immediately finds that Mr. Hemani is part of The People. He is a U.S. Citizen who has resided in the U.S. his entire life.

This single finding shifts the burden to the state to prove that §922(g)(3) has a match in this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.

The magistrate continues, finding that intoxication laws are not sufficiently analogous to 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(3). He also rejects Reconstruction-era state laws as being too late in time.

It was interesting to me because these historical regulations were used in the Wolford case out of the Third Circuit. I used a less formal presentation to knock the same laws out of contention there as the magistrate does here.

In conclusion, the magistrate recommends that 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(3) be found unconstitutional after Bruen.

Later the district trial court granted Mr. Hemani’s motion to dismiss on the ground that 18 U.S.C. §922(g)(3) is unconstitutional as applied to Mr. Hemani.

Because the court found §922(g)(3) didn’t apply to Mr. Hemani, they dismissed his facial challenge as moot. In other words, Mr. Hemani won, but The People did not get a piece of that cake.

The state appealed.

The Fifth Circuit merits panel affirmed (agreed with) the district court.

In my opinion, this was an easy out. No inferior court really wants to say that any part of §922(g) is unconstitutional on its face. To do so would be to break so much of the gun control legislation in this country.

On Petition For Certiorari

Interestingly, the state didn’t immediately appeal to the Supreme Court. Instead they requested an extension while they considered the appeal.

In the end, the DOJ petitioned The Court for an answer to the question:

Whether 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(3), the federal statute that prohibits the possession of firearms by a person who “is an unlawful user of or addicted to any controlled substance,” violates the Second Amendment as applied to respondent.
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, United States v. Hemani, No. 24-1234 (U.S. filed June 2, 2025),

Most of the DOJ’s argument is a repeat of out-of-time-frame regulations, intentionally conflating “temporary” with “lifetime” prohibitions. As Mr. Hemani pointed out, being found guilty under §922(g)(3) means that you are now prohibited under §922(g)(1). Thus, (g)(3) is a lifetime prohibition.

The state then brings up §925(c). This is the method by which a person can get their Second Amendment protected rights back.

There are more than a few issues with this. Until very recently, and it still might be the case, the U.S. Congress had not allocated any funding towards implementing §925(c). You can request your rights back, but there is nobody to process your request. Therefore, no getting your rights back.

I believe that this might have been addressed in the current budget. If so, this allows this argument to stand. Actually, if I had read the next paragraph, the DOJ says just this, That program was effectively disabled from 1992 until 2025…

Unfortunately, to use §925(c), you have to admit to a violation of §922(g). That doesn’t sound like a wise thing. If the government decides you don’t get your rights back, you’ve admitted to a crime, for which you can be punished.

Certiorari

  • Petitioner’s Brief on the Merits: Due December 4, 2025
  • Amicus Curiae Briefs in Support of Petitioner or Neither Party: Due December 11, 2025
  • Respondent’s Brief on the Merits: Due January 3, 2026
  • Amicus Curiae Briefs in Support of Respondent: Due January 10, 2026
  • Petitioner’s Reply Brief: Due February 2, 2026
  • Oral Arguments: Expected in March 2026 (not yet scheduled)

This will be a big case.

IANAL Analysis

There are some serious problems with this case. Mrs. Hemani, the mother of Ali, is an active Muslim. A real little Satan, big Satan, martyr-loving barbarian. She was interviewed in Iran, telling the world that she wanted her sons to become martyrs. She made Facebook posts saying the same thing. All in all, she is a piece of garbage, exactly the sort of person I wish we could deport.

There does not seem to be any facts in evidence that Ali Hemani is a drug-dealing piece of garbage, but the district court detained him for the duration of his trial. He’s not a good person.

This Supreme Court is a law and order court. This administration is a law and order administration. This means that Mr. Hemani deserves to be imprisoned for being a despicable lowlife human.

This does not mean that it is constitutional to do so.

By stating the question as an “as-applied”, the DOJ is giving The Court an opportunity to find a way to throw Mr. Hemani in prison for up to 15 years while not messing up the progress we’ve made in Second Amendment jurisprudence.

We want Justice Thomas to write the opinion for Wolford v. Lopez. We don’t want Chief Justice Roberts writing another one of his easily twisted opinions here. Justice Alito would be a good choice.

Regardless, I expect a splitting of the baby. I expect we will hear more about “temporary” and “non-violent”, building on Rahimi.

I’m also hoping that we see another clear statement that “the plain text” is a simple test; the inferior courts got it right.

We might even see more on what time period is the correct time period for analogous regulations.

In short, I’m hopeful but not expecting this to be a total win for The People.

Wolford v. Lopez, the assumed schedule

Wolford is in an interlocutory state. They are appealing a preliminary injunction.

The purpose of the trial court is to gather evidence, hear legal arguments, and then decide based on evidence and the legal standing.

What the Supreme Court has said is that Second Amendment challenges do not need evidence. They are legal decisions, decided by the courts.

The law says “x”. The challenger says the plain text of the Second Amendment covers the conduct regulated by the law. The burden shifts to the state to show that the current law is consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearms regulation.

There is no evidence to present. The court decides if the plain text covers the conduct. The court decides if the government has proven a history of firearms regulation that matches the current law. If the state fails to meet its burden, then the law is ruled unconstitional.

If the state wishes to bring in expert testimony regarding this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation, that expert must be a lawyer. Not only must they be a lawyer, they must be part of the case.

Friends of the court can express their opinion, but the only place those opinions have any weight is if they are legal arguments regarding regulations from the time of the founding or somehow relevant to finding that the conduct is not covered by the Second Amendment.

At this point, everybody in Wolford has agreed the plain text of the Second Amendment is implicated. The state can present their arguments to the Supreme Court just as easily as to the trial court. There is no value the trial court will add to the analysis the Supreme Court will do.

Which leads us to, when will we hear back from the Supreme Court?

Cert was granted on October 3, 2025. Per rule 25 of the Supreme Court, the Petitioner (Plaintiff) must have their briefing in within 45 days. November 17, 2025. It is unlikely that this date will be pushed. Amici briefs supporting the Petitioner are due 7 days after.

The Respondent’s (defendant’s) brief is due 30 days after that, on December 17th. Again, Amici briefs the Respondent or neither are due 7 days after.

The Petitioner gets to reply to the Respondent’s brief. That is due 30 days after the respondent dockets their brief, putting us at January 10, 2026.

If everything goes as scheduled, oral arguments will be heard in February, with the opinion issuing in May.

I expect we will see at least one other Second Amendment case this term. If the Court is looking at Wolford to address sensitive places, then there will be no other sensitive places challenges heard.

That leaves a case dealing on what “arms” means. When that case is heard, they will address the proper usage of the “in common use for lawful purposes” shortcut to a Second Amendment win.

Reese v. Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms & Explosives, Update

Yeah, it really was the judge being a clown. The state did not ask for membership lists.

On Friday the parties, the state, and the plaintiffs filed a joint motion to amend the final judgement.

  • The Court’s Judgment compels Plaintiffs to disclose their membership as of November 6, 2020, to the Government by October 28, 2025.
  • The Government, as a general policy, does not compel disclosure of the identity of members of private organizations, and the Government did not seek to do so here.
  • Plaintiffs assert that the Judgment’s order compelling them to disclose their membership violates the First Amendment and would subject them to irreparable harm. See, e.g. Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta, 594 U.S. 595, 606 (2021).
  • To be clear, Plaintiffs do not concede that altering the Judgment in this way would make its scope appropriate, and Plaintiffs retain their right to challenge all aspects of the Judgment on appeal. However, in the absence of the proposed amendment, Plaintiffs face an imminent deadline compelling the disclosure of their membership information.
  • To avoid the need for Plaintiffs to file an emergency motion to stay the disclosure deadline, the Parties respectfully request that the Court act on this motion by October 14, 2025.

Short translation, the state is still attempting to make a facial challenge judgement into an as-applied judgement, but even the government understands that demanding membership lists is verboten.

Reese v. Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco Firearms & Explosives

History

Back in November of 2020, Caleb Reese, Joseph Granich, FPC, The Second Amendment Foundation, and the Louisiana Shooting Association filed suit in the Western District of Louisiana challenging 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(b)(1) and 922(c)(1), 27 C.F.R. §§ 478.99(b)(1), 478.124(a), and 478.96(b).

U.S.C. is United States Code, or laws. C.F.R. is Code of Federal Regulations. So they are challenging the rules and regulations infringing on The People aged 18, 19, and 20 from purchasing firearms from FFLs.

The named plaintiffs, Reese and Granich, were in that age range when the suit was filed. Since it was filed in 2020, there is no way that they are still in that age range today. The case is moot.

This is why the organizations are required to be in the suit. They need real people to start the suit, but the organizations can add other members that meet the requirement of being in the age group as the original plaintiffs age out.

On May 5th, 2021, the plaintiffs did just that; they added Emily Naquin to the suit. This gave them a longer window and added a woman to the complaint.

On June 10, 2021, Joseph Granich left the suit.

In July of 2022, the court was formally made aware of Bruen. This means that the district court must use the Heller methodology as affirmed in Bruen. Is the plain text of the Second Amendment implicated? Is there an analogous regulation in this Nation’s history of firearm regulation?

The state immediately responded that Bruen affirms the Second Amendment allows a ‘variety’ of gun regulations, including ‘laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms’. In other words, the state ignored the holding and dicta of The Court and instead cherry-picked a phrase from a concurrence. I love how they say, “Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence emphasizes….” They added the word emphasizes to imply what is not there.

On December 21, 2022, the district court found that the Second Amendment was implicated. Further, it found that Congress had designated 18, 19, and 20-year-olds as particularly dangerous, and therefore they could be disarmed in keeping with this Nation’s history of firearms regulation. Never mind that this implies that Congress can disarm any group by declaring them “dangerous.”

The case was appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, which issued its opinion January 30 and issued its mandate on April 17, 2025.

The Fifth Circuit Court’s Judgment

The Fifth Circuit dealt with the state’s contention that the law didn’t even implicate the Second Amendment like this:

Addressing the first question under Bruen, the government contends that “the Second Amendment’s plain text” does not cover the conduct that §§ 922(b)(1) and (c)(1) prohibit. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 24, 142 S. Ct. at 2130. The government argues that a limited ban on the purchase of handguns from FFLs is not an infringement on the Second Amendment rights, and in any event eighteen-to-twenty-year-olds are not among “the people” protected by the right. We reject these points, then move to Bruen’s second inquiry: …
Reese v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 127 F.4th 583, 593 (5th Cir. 2025)

Note that the state doesn’t even believe that newly enlisted members of our military are part of The People.

The court then went on to discuss what plain text means. The threshold textual question is not whether the laws and regulations impose reasonable or historically grounded limitations, but whether the Second Amendment “covers” the conduct (commercial purchases) to begin with.Id.. Clearly this is the correct methodology.

Step one isn’t really a step; it is a simple question. If it takes more than a sentence, then they are likely doing it wrong.

Or, put another way, why not assume it is covered under the plain text? The courts used to do this, until they couldn’t wave a magic wand and say the state’s argument is more important than The People’s rights.

One brief pre-ratification aberration and a handful of post-ratification examples do not outweigh the consistent approach of all states—including Virginia—where the minimum age of eighteen prevailed at or immediately after ratification of the Second Amendment. See NRA II, 714 F.3d at 340–41 n.8 (Jones, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). The founding-era laws are far more probative of what “the people” meant when the Second Amendment was ratified, as “Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they were understood to have when the people adopted them.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 634–35, 128 S. Ct. at 2821.
Id.

This is a good example of “tradition.” We can look at this Nation’s history of firearm regulation and find outliers. These outliers do not outweigh the consistent approach, the traditions of all states.

In the end, the Fifth Circuit concludes:

Ultimately, the text of the Second Amendment includes eighteen-to-twenty-year-old individuals among “the people” whose right to keep and bear arms is protected. The federal government has presented scant evidence that eighteen-to-twenty-year-olds’ firearm rights during the founding-era were restricted in a similar manner to the contemporary federal handgun purchase ban, and its 19th century evidence “cannot provide much insight into the meaning of the Second Amendment when it contradicts earlier evidence.” Id. at 66, 142 S. Ct. at 2154 (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 614, 128 S. Ct. at 2810). In sum, 18 U.S.C. §§ 992(b)(1), (c)(1)[sic 922] and their attendant regulations are unconstitutional in light of our Nation’s historic tradition of firearm regulation.

We REVERSE the district court’s judgment and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Id.

Three of the potential outcomes from an appeal are “AFFIRM,” which says the superior court agrees with the inferior court. “VACATE,” which says that the inferior court got it wrong and needs to do it over, considering the named opinions. But the strongest of them all is to “REVERSE.” To reverse an inferior court’s decision is to say not only did they get it wrong, but that the superior court doesn’t believe the inferior court will get it right.

Or in some cases, there is no need for the inferior court to put their oar in the water. What’s done is done.

The District Court Beclowns Themselves

The circuit court’s holding is that 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(b)(1), (c)(1) and the regulations that build on them are unconstitutional. There is no wiggle room in that opinion. It is a pure win for The People.

There is nothing in that opinion that suggests that this is an as-applied or is any other way limited to just the plaintiffs.

In Rahimi we had an “as applied” finding. This is being played out in other §922(g)(8) situations. They are coming down in “as applied” opinions.

Once the district court receives its marching orders, it is supposed to follow orders like the inferior it is. There is a clear winner and a clear loser.

The court then orders the parties, both the winners and the losers, to submit a proposed judgment. The court is supposed to look at the proposed judgment, make sure it aligns with the superior court’s orders, and then sign off.

Generally, the parties work out an agreement, which is then presented to the court.

The plaintiffs, the good guys and winners, suggested the following:

The Court declares that 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(b)(1) & (c)(1), their derivative regulations, and all other laws, regulations, policies, practices, and customs implementing or effectuating the same, violate the right to keep and bear arms secured by the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution by prohibiting the sale or delivery of handguns and handgun ammunition to 18-to-20-year-olds.

With the court ordering the state to stop enforcing the rules and regulations. This judgment would stop the exercise of the relevant rules and regulations in the jurisdiction of the Fifth Circuit. A giant win. And it could be used in support of other cases.

The state, the defendants, the bad guys, and the losers proposed the following:

The Court enters declaratory judgment, as described in paragraph 3 below, with respect to (A) Plaintiffs Caleb Reese, Joseph Granich, Emily Naquin; and (B) individuals who (i) were members of Plaintiffs Firearms Policy Coalition, Inc., Second Amendment Foundation, or Louisiana Shooting Association at the time this action was filed on November 6, 2020, and (ii) have been identified and verified by respective Plaintiff organizations during the course of this litigation.

Here the state changes this from a facial win to an as-applied. Which is even worse than it originally sounds. This judgment would only last for 3 years. At the end of three years, everybody that would be covered by this judgment would have aged out of the category.

The state argues that Trump v. CASA applies. The state claims that the judgment of the court would be a universal injunction, which would be too wide. But that was never the case. This ruling would only apply within the Fifth Circuit. So the state is full of excrement.

They go on to say that it should only apply to members of the organizations that were members when the case was filed. This would limit the relief to people that joined FPC or SAF when they were children; otherwise, they would have already aged out.

The state is also requiring that the organizational plaintiffs provide membership lists because: limiting the scope of permanent relief to members of the organizational plaintiffs who were members when suit was filed is necessary because only such persons have standing to sue, and because equity requires this limitation to avoid incentivizing free riders.

The judge’s final order includes FFLs that were members of the organizations when the suit was filed in 2020.

The only people who would benefit from this order are the two named plaintiffs.

Conclusion

The judge is a freaking clown. He got his knuckles rapped by his superior and has decided to thumb his bright red nose at them.

Wolford v. Lopez

History

In April of 2025, Wolford et al. petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.

This followed the Ninth Circuit’s decision that a vampire law was constitutional. A vampire law is one in which you are not allowed to bring your firearm onto private property without express consent from the owner or the owner’s agent.

The good news is that the Second Circuit Court, in a rare moment of integrity to the Constitution, found the same law in New York State to be unconstitutional.

This created a circuit split. That plus this being a new attack vector on the people’s right to keep and bear arms made it an interesting case.

It was not as interesting, in my opinion, as the sensitive places and other cases pending before the court that were denied cert.

Cert Is Granted

On October 3rd, just days before the start of the new term, the Supreme Court of the United States took a Second Amendment case.

My mind is blown. I wasn’t even looking for anything in this case.

Pam Bondi’s DOJ had filed an amicus brief in favor of The People back in May.

Conclusion

We will have a briefing schedule shortly. Once that is available, I’ll do a deep dive into this case. This case has the makings of another Bruen.

While the question isn’t that big, the dicta surrounding the finding is likely to be a slap in the face to the inferior courts.

This will be one of the first cases the Supreme Court hears after the absolutely vicious statements given by the justices regarding the behavior of the inferior court’s attacks on the Trump administration.

Photo illustration of a sign encouraging acting to stop voter suppression or activities that block voting.

Redistricting

Representatives are allocated by population. The higher the state’s population, the more representatives they have.

The total number of representatives has been fixed for a while. This means that if one state gets more representatives, some other state gets fewer.

Not only do representatives determine the make up of the House, they also determine the make up of the electorial collage.

Thus, the number of representatives a state has is critical in determining political outcomes.

One of the issues currently being debated is a new census before the 2028 election. There are indications that some states, such as California, are overrepresented because the census counted criminal illegal aliens. Look into the 3/5s clause in the Constitution for why this is an issue.

After every census, the states can redistrict based on the new census numbers.

In 1965, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965. This act sets new rules for how the representatives should be chosen by the many states.

Unfortunately, this act is likely at odds with the Constitution. In particular the Fourteenth Amendment. Any law that Congress passes that is contrary to the Constitution is void. Unfortunately, it takes a case reaching the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court agreeing the law is contrary to the Constitution for the law to be struck down.

Of course, this hasn’t stopped rogue, agenda-driven, inferior court judges from pretending that Congress can pass laws restricting the powers of the Article II executive.

The question then becomes, “How do you create districts for a state that are representative of the people of the state?”

Generally the districts of a state are created to control the outcome of elections.

Here is part of the 2011 congressional districts of Maryland:

If you look at Congressional District 01 in orange, you can see that it has many counties within it. But more importantly, it extends into Baltimore County. The same with District 02. Most of the military of the Aberdeen Proving Grounds and Edgewood Area are in District 02. But I also include a part of Baltimore City and Howard County.

I’m sure you would not be surprised to learn that the very high concentration of PoC voting Democrat causes Districts 01 and 02 to be Democrat districts.

The current congressional districts follow the county borders.

The way this worked was that everybody knows that Baltimore is a huge Democrat stronghold. It is so huge that they can dilute it with Republicans and still come out for the Democrats.

By using the Democrat voters of Baltimore in districts 1, 2, 3, and 7 they made 4 of the 8 districts +Democrat. District 4 is using the Democrat voters of Montgomery County to overwhelm the Republican voters of the rest of the district. Districts 5, 6, and 8 are Democrat strongholds; they don’t need any help from the city.

This districting leaves Republicans of Maryland without representation in Congress.

In Louisiana v. Callais the Supreme Court is hearing a case challenging the VRA on Constitutional grounds.

In Robinson v. Ardoin in 2023, a district court found that Louisiana had violated the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The inferior court ordered the state to create an additional majority-black district to avoid “vote dilution.”

This court order resulted in Louisiana’s SB8. The sponsor of SB8 said “We all know why we’re here. We were ordered to draw a new Black district, and that’s what I’ve done”.

That new district stretches 250 miles from the Shreveport in the northwest to Baton Rouge in southeast Lousiiana.

All to create another black district. When we say black district, what is really meant is “Democrat district.”

Well the Supreme Court got the case and decided to punt. Thomas was unhappy with that and told the world how unhappy he was.

This case was argued on March 24th in the 2024 term. Instead of issuing an opinion before the end of the term, the Court instead put the case back on the calendar for reargument.

It appears that the Court wants to be briefed on specific aspects of the case.

Conclusion

This case is outside my knowledge base. In trying to understand the question presented, I’m lost. And that is just one page. Thank goodness Thomas writes in English that I can understand.

This is just another case clawing back the rights of The People after years of reverse descrimination.