Arguments

Wolford v. Lopez

In this analysis, I’m not going to be doing as much quoting. There are others that do so. Instead, I’m going to attempt to distill the argument or line of questioning.

Alan A. Beck, lawyer for the good guy

The Second Amendment is implicated. Hawaii has not met its burden to prove there is a historical tradition of firearms regulation that matches this law. This is a presumptive ban on The People’s right to bear arms, even if not stated explicitly.

Thomas: You argue that the law prevents access to about 97% of public areas? how did you arrive at that?

Beck: The entire package of laws is 96.4%, this law is less. We got that value from an architecture firm that went through public records of the County of Maui.

Sotomayor (interrupting Thomas): It’s not really 97%, right? This law is much less than that. People can carry in other places, Right?

All right. So you say that there is a constitutional right to carry a gun on private property?

Beck: Yes.

Sotomayor: I’ve never seen that right. I mean, I understand that there is a right to carry a gun on private property with an owner’s consent, express or implicit, correct?

Me: I did read it in the Constitution: the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. And she just said it, she gave it away. You have that right if you have the right to carry on public property if you have the owner’s express or implicit consent. And that is what property open to the public means: you have explicit consent to enter, and you have the implicit consent to carry.

The state of Hawaii removes that implicit consent to carry.

Sotomayor then goes on to try to conflate carrying where you are legally allowed to go with trespass. It is difficult to follow because she wants it to be difficult to follow. She is attempting to make the case about property rights. Which is not at question.

Nobody is arguing that private property owners can forbid trespass and can set rules for entering their property. “No shoes, no shirt, no service” is exactly that. A “No Guns” sign means I’m shopping somewhere else.

She then goes on to yap about the “custom” of carrying on private property with implied consent. She then pulls a quick one by trying to say that since Hawaii has a 200 year custom of forbidding firearms, this is the custom that should stand now. Beck fires back that it is a “custom of the nation”, not the state. Falling into her verbal trap.

There are no laws in this Nation’s historical tradition of firearms regulation that takes away that implied consent.

Sotomayor and Beck get into a back and forth regarding a previous Supreme Court case, McKee. Sotomayor claims it was talking about the customs of just the state of Missouri, while Beck points out that Justice Scalia used the term “Nation” multiple times. I’ll take Beck’s word over the second dumbest justice to sit on the Supreme Court.

She then tries to bring in laws from 1721, 1722. There’s a huge issue with this. The laws of 1721, 1722 are the laws of England, not this Nation.
Even if the laws were applicable, they all dwelt with closed lands. Lands that were not open to the public.

Barrett and Beck agree that Hawaii could pass a law that prohibited carrying on closed lands as a property right.

Dumber (Jackson) now opens her mouth. Justice Thomas takes off his glasses, leans back in his chair and waits for the magpie to stop making noise.

This is just a property right issue. Property rights trump Second Amendment rights.

Beck calls her BS saying the issue implicates the right to keep and bear arms. Jackson says it doesn’t. It is just property rights.

Gorsuch: This law destroys the right to bear arms in Hawaii. Where does this fit into the Bruen framework?

Beck: Carrying is implicated by this law. The burden must shift to state to prove a match with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearms regulation.

Sotomayor: So the 96% doesn’t really matter? There’s no means end scrutiny? Hawaii has a right to regulate a custom. That means the Second Amendment isn’t implicated.

Using a 1763 for the colony of New York, they banned trespass on private land; that means Hawaii can ban carry on public land.

Sotomayor’s method is to talk over, to interrupt the lawyers she disagrees with. She doesn’t listen to what Beck has to say.

She is actually doing performative art. She and Jackson are both saying things that can be quoted later and which they will quote in their dissent about why this was wrongly decided.

Sotomayor ran this guy out of time. And even when Chief Justice Roberts says he is out of time, Sotomayor talks over Roberts for another paragraph or two. Beck tries to answer; Sotomayor cuts him off before Roberts cuts Sotomayor’s line of questioning off.

Roberts uses a gas station and a home on the side of the road to highlight that there is a difference between private property closed to the public and private property open to the public. Beck does a fantastic job of pointing out that all other rights extend to the door. As Roberts says, “A stranger can walk off the sidewalk and go up to the door?” Beck, “Yes, up to the door, Your Honor”

Alito asks if there are any other objects besides guns that a person may not possess when they enter private property open to the public.

Sotomayor goes back to the Hawaii custom of denying rights to prove that they should still be able to deny The People the right to keep and bear arms.

And she is snarky about it; it looks like she yanks some number out of her ass: So 78 percent of Hawaii residents and 64 percent of Hawaii gun owners do not think that loaded concealed weapons should be allowed into businesses at all, correct?

Beck: I’m unaware of that statistic, Your Honor.

Sotomayor: “I wasn’t aware of your 97 — 96 point — percent number”

She would have been aware of his numbers if she had read the fillings. Thomas knew. Thomas mentioned it, not Beck.

Kagan: Hasn’t the state met its burden with the many historical regulations it has cited? And they have multiple references to legislation that flipped the default.

Beck: No. The poaching laws limited carrying on private lands for poaching, not for self-defense. The other laws cited are black code laws. Laws designed to discriminate against blacks. We’ve moved past that.

Kagan: Well, yes, they are anti-pouching laws, and yes, they did allow people to carry for self-defense, but that is close enough to banning armed self-defense on private property, right?

Kagan: You see, the anti-poaching laws were about preventing injuries to private property, and Hawaii’s law is about preventing injuries also.

Me: No, anti-poaching laws were to stop people from stealing food on the hoof.

Beck: This entire line of questioning is irrelevant. The laws you are referring to were closed property; Hawaii’s law is for property open to the public.

Gorsuch: The laws being referenced are a New Jersey 1771 anti-poaching law. The other is an 1865 Louisiana law that a Reconstruction governor explained was aimed at the freedmen. A black code law. Do you think that black codes should inform our decision-making?

Beck: Hell no.

Gorsuch: Well, the state claims it is a dead ringer for this statute.

Beck: The 1865 law was expressly passed to discriminate against African Americans that were newly freed slaves. And I just don’t see how a law like that can be used to be analogized to a modern-day law, this modern-day law, Your Honor.

Barrett asks if Beck agrees with everything the government said in their brief. Beck thinks she is talking about the state of Hawaii. Barrett clarifies that she is speaking of the US federal government, which filed supporting The People and will be arguing next. Beck corrects himself and there is a bunch of laughter.

Barrett: The government that’s on your same side.

Beck: Yes, I understand.

(Laughter.)

Beck: I agree with every —

Barrett: I’m not asking you to throw your case away.

(Laughter.)

Beck: I fully endorse the United States’ brief, Your Honor.

Barrett asks for clarification regarding “open to public” and “closed to public” and the 1865 black code law. Beck replies that there might be something to discuss there, but the fact that it is a black code law means it is not part of this Nation’s historical tradition of firearms regulation.

Jackson is back for another whiff at bat: Chief Justice Roberts asked about a gas station on the side of the road. We don’t get to enter that gas station because of a Constitutional right but because the owner of the gas station has given us consent. That consent has limits, and the owner can set those limits, and the state can set limits, right?

Beck: You have a constitutional right to carry your firearm onto that specific gas station.

Good going, Mr. Beck. Don’t let Jackson distract you.

Goodness, is Jackson dumb or just incompetent? She is attempting to set a word trap, and she’s nowhere near as good as Sotomayor, and Sotomayor is bad at it. She denies there is a constitutional right to carry on private property. She then says that there is an implied license. Then claims that there is a historical tradition of requiring a license to enter private property.

This is so convoluted. Nowhere do you need a “license” to enter private property. She is using an obsolete definition where “license” is the same as “permission”. She then continues to use the term “license” to say that you require a license to enter. This type of language will be used in the dissent to justify Hawaii’s licensing (permission) scheme.

Cringe warning

Jackson:

Let me just ask you about the black codes. Justice Gorsuch raised it. And I guess what I’m wondering — your answer to him was they can’t be and shouldn’t be used.

And I guess I’m wondering whether that doesn’t signal a problem with the Bruen test, that to the extent that we have a test that relates to historical regulation, but all of the history of regulation is not taken into account, I — I think there might be something wrong with the test. So can you speak to that?

(I had to take a break after that.)

She goes on, saying that when Thomas wrote “this Nation’s historical tradition of firearms regulations” he said that we were bound by history. Since 1865 is part of our history, then that should be part of the Bruen test. Which also means that any law ever passed becomes part of our history and thus becomes justification for all future infringements, even if that law is later struck down.

Ms. Harris is the Principal Deputy Solicitor General for the Federal DOJ. She was acting solicitor general before D. John Sauer was confirmed as solicitor general. She is now the second in command of the office of the solicitor general. John Sauer was presenting on a different case the day this case was argued.

In other words, she’s way the heck up there. Trump->Pam Bondi->John Sauer->Ms. Harris. And she’s arguing for us!

Harris: Hawaii is lying about why they passed this law. It is aimed at only legal gun owners with CCWs. There are no other items these laws affect. Besides, the only law they can use to support their current law is an unconstitutional black code.

There is back and forth regarding pretextual laws. The example given is of English game laws. These laws were to “preserve game” but were designed to prevent commoners from hunting.

The gist is that when looking for an analog firearm regulation, the real reason is looked at, not the pretext. Hawaii says it is protecting property rights for safety reasons. Just because they say it is for safety and property rights doesn’t mean that laws dealing with property rights and safety are a match to this law.

You have to look for the true reason for the law. In this case, the vampire laws are designed to keep people from carrying because there are too many places where it is illegal.

Kagan opines that The Court doesn’t look at the motives a law was passed. Harris fires back that if the stated purpose and the text show a fundamental mismatch, it belies the asserted motive of the legislature.

Kagan says The Court can’t do that because that would be means-ends scrutiny.

It is clear that the three crones of the Supreme Court are trying to neuter Bruen.

Kavanaugh has had enough of this.

Why are we making it complicated? The text of the Second Amendment covers arms.

Part 3 of Heller says that means what it — Heller says it means what it says, says what it means. Part 3 of Heller says there are certain exceptions to that or contours on that which are rooted, but they have to be rooted in history.

Here, there’s no sufficient history supporting the regulation, end of case.

Isn’t that kind of the straightforward way rather than getting into this whole new elaborate pretext analysis, which, as Justice Kagan says, sounds like what we moved away from?

Harris: Absolutely!

This is a trap that “smart” people fall into. They get distracted by the details. Instead of focusing on the big picture, they get lost in the weeds, and then instead of deciding based on the big picture, they end in a major fight over details.

Harris is fighting a different battle here, though. She is fighting to make it clear that doing an end run around the limits the Supreme Court sets out is not acceptable to the United States. She is clearly targeting New York, California, and the rest of the states that had Bruen tantrum response bills.

Kavanaugh is say to keep it simple. Hawaii didn’t meet their burden. Done and done.

Gorsuch brings up First Amendment case law that addressed a similar issue. Harris uses Lamont as her example. In Lamont they flipped the script on mail delivery. The rule was that you got mail of all sorts unless you explicitly said “no”. The law in question in Lamont flipped it to require a person to explicitly request mail on a “very easy-to-send postcard”. This was firmly rejected by The Court.

Jackson is back with another attempt to make this only about property rights. Harris gives a perfect example of how stupid this argument is. She points out that today a politician can have somebody come to your door to campaign. But if this law was followed in a First Amendment situation, the homeowner would have to post a large sign on their property before that door knock could take place.

Alito sends a soft pitch asking about why antipoaching laws are not an appropriate analogue. Harris knocks it out of the park. You know why.

Alito then asks what is the purpose of the Second Amendment right is. Harris, self-defense, and other lawful purposes.

Alito focuses on Heller, which he wrote, to point out that the wording was about self-defense but that other lawful purposes also existed. Harris does a good job in the answers.

Sotomayor is back. Still attempting to make it all about property rights and the owner’s consent. She tries to use Hawaii’s tradition of screwing over The People’s right to keep and bear arms over the last 200 years as the tradition that allows Hawaii to pass the vampire laws.

Harris fires back, stating clearly that local customs in a state doesn’t allow that state to have its own Second Amendment. The meaning of the Second Amendment doesn’t change as you move from state to state.

Ok, this is good!

Harris:

It is 2026 and it is somewhat astonishing that black codes, which are unconstitutional, are being offered as evidence of what our tradition of constitutionally permissible firearm regulation looks like.

Those laws are dead ringers only in the sense that this law too is an unconstitutional pretext. The black codes were offered, as you mentioned, by states before their readmission to the union. It is not an indictment of the Bruen framework to say that unconstitutional laws do not count in illuminating a valid tradition.

It is almost as if Harris had this response lined up before it was asked. Great response.

In an interesting exchange between Kavanaugh and Harris, Kavanaugh asks about sensitive places as mentioned in Heller. He attempts to get Harris to agree with Heller as is. Instead, Harris goes with, We agree with the principle as stated that there are obviously sensitive places. You determine them with respect to the history of firearm regulation.

This is a massive statement by the DoJ. It says they are not arguing that sensitive places do exist, but that it isn’t as easy as saying, “That’s a sensitive place,” to get guns banned. You can’t declare the island of Manhattan a sensitive place. So New York declared Times Square a sensitive place.

Barrett asks about anti-poaching regulations. Harris points out that poaching was and is a problem.

In my state, and most states that I know, you have to post your land to keep hunters out. Hunters are presumed to be able to hunt on any land that is not posted. In my state the limit on where you hunt is 100 yards of an occupied dwelling. And they mean occupied as people living in, not that nobody is home.

JUSTICE JACKSON: So I guess I really don’t understand your response to Justice Gorsuch on the black codes. And here I thought that Jackson had gotten her “I don’t understand” under control. There is so much she doesn’t understand.

She’s arguing that black code laws, laws that have been found unconstitutional, can be used to justify more unconstitutional laws.

More tomorrow.

Educational Industry Language – Not Abuse

After reading Chris’s article on the so-called “abuse” of language in the education industry, I felt he may have taken the argument a bit too far. I do agree that education is full of jargon and constantly shifting acronyms. But do I believe this language is meant to harm or confuse students? No. In most cases, these changes seem intended to be more inclusive or politically correct, not malicious.

Chris and I actually discussed this during a car ride to Fort at Number 4 yesterday. I’ve since had time to reflect more on what he said. One of our points of disagreement was the shift from the word “student” to “learner.” My own school district made this change just before COVID, and while it took a few years for me to adjust, I now use “learner” regularly.

I believe this change was made with positive intentions. To me, “learner” suggests someone who is actively engaged, not just passively sitting in a chair. It reflects a belief in the potential of every child to grow, discover, and take ownership of their learning. I don’t believe the shift was done with ill will.

Chris argued that not all students are learners—that some are disruptive and show no interest in learning. I understand his point. But I still believe all students can become learners, even if they don’t show it yet. Will every child become a lifelong learner like Chris or me? Maybe not, but we can still hope and work toward that goal.

The ever-evolving language of education doesn’t bother me much. After 38 years of teaching, I’ve learned to go with the flow. I’ve seen many changes in terminology. Chris is passionate about precision in language, and while I agree that language matters, I just don’t get as worked up about it.

When our children were in elementary school, they were in the Talented and Gifted program. Later, it was renamed the “Infinity” program. I questioned the change at first, but ultimately, nothing really changed—the same kids were in the program, and they all knew they were high achievers. It was just a new label.

Similarly, the language used around learning disabilities has changed many times. These shifts often aim to reduce stigma and promote first-person language that emphasizes the individual, not the disability. As our understanding grows, so does our vocabulary.

Chris also criticized the use of the word “friend” in classrooms, something many teachers began using in the early 2000s to refer to all students. He argued that calling every classmate a “friend” confuses children, especially when some of those classmates are bullies. I agree with him on this point. The term may have been used too broadly, but again, I don’t think it was intended to cause harm.

Ultimately, words like “student” and “learner” carry different connotations. A student is typically someone who studies within a formal structure, while a learner is more self-directed and intrinsically motivated.

So, what do we want for our children? To simply complete assigned tasks, or to become curious, independent learners? Will changing our language help us reach that goal? I’m not sure, but I don’t believe these language shifts are malicious. Most are simply well-intentioned efforts to reflect evolving values in education.

Legal State Arguments

…this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation

Creating rules for anything, a game, a business, the interaction between parties, there can be negative rules, or there can be positive rules.

You can have a set of negative rules. You cannot touch the ball with your hands. This is a rule in soccer.

What was the original intention? We don’t know. What we do know is that it is legal to hit the ball with your head, knees and body, as long as you don’t touch the ball with your hands.

This means that what is not forbidden is allowed.

If on the other hand, the rules are written in a positive mode. You can only touch the ball with your legs from the thigh down. You have inverted the restrictions. What is not permitted is not allowed.

You don’t have to state “you cannot touch the ball with your hands”. This is subsumed from the default negative. If it is not permitted, you cannot do it.

Our Constitution was written as a set of positive rules for the government. The government is authorized to do X, Y and Z. They are, by design and default, not allowed to do A through W.

When the Bill of Rights was ratified, we added negative rules. “Congress shall make no law…”

There is no conflict between the amendments and the original Constitution. The Bill of Rights made explicit that which was implicit. The government shall not do C, G, and W!

Unfortunately, this left the door open for the government to do evil. “Since the Constitution doesn’t say anything about A, B, and D, we can intrude in that area!”

The explicit addition to our Constitution made this argument possible.

Since the state always seeks to increase their power over The People, this is a fight that has been going on for decades.

In Bruen, the Court made it clear that the state must …demonstrate that the regulation was consistent with this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. City Of New York, Oops. Novel citation pattern. 8 (U.S. 2020).

The state bears the burden of demonstrating to the court that the law is consistent.

Not the plaintiffs, (Good Guys), nor the court, but the state.

For the state, this is a losing position. “Shall not be infringed!” is powerful language. They want that history to be as open as possible and as wide-reaching as possible.

In the early post-Bruen cases, they through the legal dictionary at the wall to see what would stick. In Duncan, the first iteration of “historically reinvent” regulations ranged from the 1500s through the mid-1900s. They were forced to reduce that for their second iteration, I think it was limited to 50 or 100.

Today, they are attempting a different path. Using the Rahimi language, Bruen was “not meant to suggest a law trapped in amber.United States v. Zackey Rahimi, No. 22-915 (U.S.) as amplified by Justice Barrett:

Many courts, including the Fifth Circuit, have understood Bruen to require the former, narrower approach. But Bruen emphasized that “analogical reasoning” is not a “regulatory straightjacket.” 597 U. S., at 30. To be consistent with historical limits, a challenged regulation need not be an updated model of a historical counterpart. Besides, imposing a test that demands overly specific analogues has serious problems. To name two: It forces 21st-century regulations to follow late-18th-century policy choices, giving us “a law trapped in amber.” Ante, at 7. And it assumes that founding-era legislatures maximally exercised their power to regulate, thereby adopting a “use it or lose it” view of legislative authority. Such assumptions are flawed, and originalism does not require them.
id. Barrett, concurring.

Under Bruen, silence in the historical record indicates that the current has no support in this Nation’s historical tradition of firearms regulation. Now, the state claims that silence does not mean a loss. Instead, they claim that it just indicates that they didn’t wanna at the time. They could have, if they wanted to. Since they could have, the state is now authorized to do so today.

This shifts the burden to The People to show that the state in 1791 not only didn’t want to pass such regulations, but instead were prohibited by the Second Amendment.

Nasty stuff.

The State of the State’s Arguments


B.L.U.F.
A long look at what the state is arguing. It has become repetitive. We continue to examine each filing made by the state, looking for some new argument.

The best I’ve found is “oh, look at what all the district courts in infringing states have said!”
(3000 words)


Four-hundred ninety-four days ago, the Supreme Court slapped down the infringing states, “may issue” game. The Supreme Court emphasized that the two-step shuffle of means-end was not acceptable. They commanded that the inferior courts use text, history, and tradition when analyzing a Second Amendment Challenge.

The Bruen opinion calls into question every gun-control infringement in the country. The states, not happy with being forced to issue CCWs, responded with Bruen Tantrum Bills. These bills were intended as direct challenges to the Supreme Court.

Since then, there have been hundreds of Second Amendment challenges filed. Both as civil suits and as criminal defenses.

The State’s Starting Point

The states start by looking at the Heller, McDonald, and Bruen opinions. They are looking for any openings to support their infringements.

Their go-to citations are:

  • The Second Amendment is not a straight-jacket
  • We are aware of no dispute over longstanding regulations
  • We presume that laws regulating NFA items are constitutional

Since the Supreme court did not explicitly say that there are no constitutional regulations on firearms, that means there must be constitutional limits. It is the task of the state to find those constitutional regulations.

The Plain Text

In Heller the court spent many pages defining exactly what each word and phrase in the Second Amendment meant. Every. Single. Word.
Read More

Stupid Arguments before the Supreme Court

The Rahimi case has brought out all the normal infringers, along with a number of lesser known groups and people. They filed numerous amicus curiae briefs. I had intended to do a brief look through them all. Nope, no, forget it. Too much pain. What follows is a sampling of the first few, along with a couple of others I found interesting. Most of the text came from the table of contents. Take it for what you will.

(2300 words, mostly theirs)


If you want to go read these yourself, they are all on the Supreme Court’s webpage under the Rahimi case.
https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/22-915.html

American’s Against Gun Violence

  1. Bruen’s “text and history” test, applied in Rahimi, relied on two deeply flawed assumptions
    1. Both Bruen and Heller are based on the false premise that the text and history of the Second Amendment established an individual right to own a gun
      1. The “well regulated militia” clause refers to the right to possess and use firearms in connection with militia service
      2. The “keep and bear arms” clause refers to a right to possess firearms if needed for and in relation to military activities
      3. The Second Amendment did not codify any right inherited by English ancestors because no such individual right to own firearms ever existed
      4. The drafters of the Second Amendment knowingly did not include language to provide for an individual right to possess firearms for self-defense
      5. Heller and Bruen improperly departed from this Court’s interpretation of the Second Amendment
    2. Bruen’s framework is also improper because it compels a foregone conclusion and perpetuates the myth that gun ownership is important for individuals’ safety and self-defense
  2. Heller and its progeny “threaten the breakdown of law and order” as Justice Breyer warned in the Heller dissent
    1. Gun related deaths have been significantly increasing since Heller
    2. Gun ownership conveys a greater risk than benefit
    3. Gun related deaths in the United States far exceed those of any other high-income country
These infringers admit that under Heller and Bruen there is no gun control law that survives. … because it compels a foregone conclusion

American Medical Association

Read More

Corpus Linguistics

Corpus linguistics is the study of a language as that language is expressed in its text corpus (plural corpora), its body of “real world” text. Corpus linguistics proposes that a reliable analysis of a language is more feasible with corpora collected in the field—the natural context (“realia”) of that language—with minimal experimental interference.

The text-corpus method uses the body of texts written in any natural language to derive the set of abstract rules which govern that language. Those results can be used to explore the relationships between that subject language and other languages which have undergone a similar analysis. The first such corpora were manually derived from source texts, but now that work is automated.
New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. City Of New York, Oops. Novel citation pattern. 8 (U.S. 2020)

Why is this of interest in the Second Amendment

It has been litigated at the Supreme Court three times now. The right of The People to keep and bear arms is an individual right. This is shown by dictionary meanings of “to bear” and “to keep”. It makes plain sense.

It is also a plain reading of the text.

The infringers want our right to self-defense to be restricted. Horribly restricted.

The easiest way to do that is to get rid of that nasty old pest, the Second Amendment.

How they do that is to attempt to make things “not arms”. They are failing. They attempt to make it not apply in this particular location. That is being challenged and they expect to lose.

They are also attempting to redefine what “The People” means to exclude most, or at least make the process of becoming a member of “The People” a matter for the state. In other words, the state wants “The People” to mean only law-abiding, responsible citizens, as defined by them.

There is another attack vector they are using. They want the Second Amendment to be a collective right, granted to the organized militia controlled by the state.

The path they are using is corpus linguistics. The gist of which is they take all the written works from that culture, as defined by location and time, and create a “normal” meaning.

Since the term “bear arms” appears primarily in the context of armies and militias, the state, and their amicus, claim that “to keep and bear arms” exists only in the context of the Militia.

Let’s take a modern version of this. The workword “Fuck”.

To fuck has a dictionary meaning of “have sex with someone” or “an act or instance of having sex.”

If we were to collect all the uses of the word “fuck” in the United States for over the last decade (or more) we would find a different “normal” meaning. That would be more of a word of contempt, “fuck you”. Or of annoyance, “Fuck it”. Or, as just a way of adding emphasis, “clean your fucking room.”

The Supreme Court isn’t stupid. They saw through this the last time it was brought forward, and many times before.

That never stops the infringers. When we are all dead and gone, if there is still a protected right to keep and bear arms, you can bet your bottom dollar that there will be infringers out there making the same tired arguments.

Bibliography

New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. City Of New York, Oops. Novel citation pattern. (U.S. 2020)
United States v. Zackey Rahimi, No. 22-915 (U.S.)

A “new” argument


B.L.U.F. The “new” argument from the state.


In June 2008, the Supreme Court issued their first Second Amendment ruling in nearly 80 years. They were asked …whether a District of Columbia prohibition on the possession of usable handguns in the home violates the Second Amendment to the Constitution.New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. City Of New York, Oops. Novel citation pattern. 8 (U.S. 2020) The District of Columbia generally prohibited the possession of handguns.

The law was set up such that each of the pieces was individually “acceptable” before the Court’s opinion. There was a law making it a crime to carry an unregistered firearm. Then the limits on who could register a handgun were such that almost nobody was ever allowed to register a firearm.

Before addressing the verbs “keep” and “bear,” we interpret their object: “Arms.” The 18th-century meaning is no different from the meaning today. The 1773 edition of Samuel Johnson’s dictionary defined “arms” as “weapons of offence, or armour of defence.” 1 Dictionary of the English Language 107 (4th ed.) (hereinafter Johnson). Timothy Cunningham’s important 1771 legal dictionary defined “arms” as “any thing that a man wears for his defence, or takes into his hands, or useth in wrath to cast at or strike another.” 1 A New and Complete Law Dictionary (1771); see also N. Webster, American Dictionary of the English Language (1828) (reprinted 1989) (hereinafter Webster) (similar).
United States v. Zackey Rahimi, No. 22-915 (U.S.)

This defines what an “arm” is. The Heller Court went on to say:

The term was applied, then as now, to weapons that were not specifically designed for military use and were not employed in a military capacity. For instance, Cunningham’s legal dictionary gave as an example of usage: “Servants and labourers shall use bows and arrows on Sundays, & c. and not bear other arms.” See also, e.g., An Act for the trial of Negroes, 1797 Del. Laws ch. XIII, § 6, p. 104, in 1 First Laws of the State of Delaware 102, 104 (J. Cushing ed.1981 (pt. 1)); see generally State v. Duke, 42 Tex. 455, 458 (1874) (citing decisions of state courts construing “arms”). Although one founding-era thesaurus limited “arms” (as opposed to “weapons”) to “instruments of offence generally made use of in war,” even that source stated that all firearms constituted “arms.” 1 J. Trusler, The Distinction Between Words Esteemed Synonymous in the English Language 37 (1794) (emphasis added).
id.

This says that arms protected by the Second Amendment include both those “most useful for military/militia use” and those arms which are not. If it is an arm, it is protected by the Second Amendment.

From this place, the court then put limits on the arms that are protected by the Second Amendment. These were dangerous and unusual arms and NFA items. The NFA is not mentioned by name.

The court was exceptionally clear regarding “muskets are the only arms protected by the Second Amendment”. Some have made the argument, bordering on the frivolous, that only those arms in existence in the 18th century are protected by the Second Amendment. We do not interpret constitutional rights that way.…Missing citations for LPGQXCDT

We reach the question, then: Does the preface fit with an operative clause that creates an individual right to keep and bear arms? It fits perfectly, once one knows the history that the founding generation knew and that we have described above. That history showed that the way tyrants had eliminated a militia consisting of all the able-bodied men was not by banning the militia but simply by taking away the people’s arms, enabling a select militia or standing army to suppress political opponents. This is what had occurred in England that prompted codification of the right to have arms in the English Bill of Rights.
Missing citations for LPGQXCDT

Yeah, it is an individual right.

Here is the crux of the post Heller battle for gun rights:

We also recognize another important limitation on the right to keep and carry arms. Miller said, as we have explained, that the sorts of weapons protected were those “in common use at the time.” 307 U.S., at 179, 59 S. Ct. 816. We think that limitation is fairly supported by the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of “dangerous and unusual weapons.” See 4 Blackstone 148-149 (1769); 3 B. Wilson, Works of the Honourable James Wilson 79 (1804); J. Dunlap, The New-York Justice 8 (1815); C. Humphreys, A Compendium of the Common Law in Force in Kentucky 482 (1822); 1 W. Russell, A Treatise on Crimes and Indictable Misdemeanors 271-272 (1831); H. Stephen, Summary of the Criminal Law 48 (1840); E. Lewis, An Abridgment of the Criminal Law of the United States 64 (1847); F. Wharton, A Treatise on the Criminal Law of the United States 726 (1852). See also State v. Langford, 10 N.C. 381, 383-384 (1824); O’Neill v. State, 16 Ala. 65, 67 (1849); English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 476 (1871); State v. Lanier, 71 N.C. 288, 289 (1874).
Missing citations for LPGQXCDT

This is what every infringing legislature hangs their argument on. This is the hook that will allow their particular infringement to slip past the protections of the Second Amendment. Unfortunately, Heller went on to say “text, history, and tradition” are the actual methods of judging a regulation.

I often wonder how the anti-gun people get their marching orders so quickly. And why they are so lock step with one another. I just found one of the reasons:

Justice BREYER moves on to make a broad jurisprudential point: He criticizes us for declining to establish a level of scrutiny for evaluating Second Amendment restrictions. He proposes, explicitly at least, none of the traditionally expressed levels (strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, rational basis), but rather a judge-empowering “interest-balancing inquiry” that “asks whether the statute burdens a protected interest in a way or to an extent that is out of proportion to the statute’s salutary effects upon other important governmental interests.” Post, at 2852. After an exhaustive discussion of the arguments for and against gun control, Justice BREYER arrives at his interest-balanced answer: because handgun violence is a problem because the law is limited to an urban area, and because there were somewhat similar restrictions in the founding period (a false proposition that we have already discussed), the interest-balancing inquiry results in the constitutionality of the handgun ban. QED.
Missing citations for LPGQXCDT

This is the Heller court rejecting means-end balancing. Means-end balancing comes from the dissenting opinions. In other words, from the argument that lost.

Bruen reaffirmed Heller and put a stop to means-end. This reduced the process of analyzing a Second Amendment challenge to a regulation to the following steps:

Does the challenged regulation implicate the scope of the Second Amendment? If it does not implicate the scope of the Second Amendment, the challenge loses.

Is the regulation a ban? If the regulation is a ban, are the arms banned in common use for lawful purposes? If the answer is yes, then the ban is unconstitutional.

If the regulation is not a ban, but does implicate the scope of the Second Amendment, the burden shifts to the state to prove a history and tradition of analogous regulations.

The state argues that their infringement does not implicate the Second Amendment. That is easily overcome.

The state argues that their infringement does not implicate an arm. Here, the state attempts to place the burden on the plaintiffs to prove that the item(s) in question are, indeed, arms.

If the infringement is a ban, the state then argues that the arm is not “in common use”. They try to limit the definition of “use” by putting qualifiers, “for self-defense” being the most commonly used manipulation.

The new argument

evidence in the record before this Court. Their showing is marked by argument without citations and sources showing that their argument would be supported by admissible evidence, even under the relaxed rules for preliminary injunctions. It is wholly unclear whether all of the weapons (like conversion kits or semiautomatic pistols) regulated by HB 1240 are “in common use” based on the Plaintiffs’ scant submission. The Plaintiffs have not made “a clear showing” of evidence (Winter at 22) that supports their contention that all of the weapons covered by HB 1240 are “in common use” and therefore not “unusual” (Heller at 626).
Missing citations for 4J6Z58IV

Emphasis in original.

There is no evidence that an “assault weapon” is in common use for lawful purposes?

The court is taking the side of the state here. They contend that because there is no legal evidence that hundreds of thousands of “assault weapons” are in common use, the plaintiffs have not met their burden.

I’m not exactly sure how you provide evidence that there are millions of “assault weapons” in common use. The court is unlikely to accept surveys as “evidence”. Nor are they likely to accept sales records. The court is bending over to say “well, most, if not all, of those guns were sold to law enforcement”.

They also ignore Caetano where the Supreme Court didn’t bother with figuring out exactly how many stun guns are out there. How many were owned per person.

The state has gotten this court to say that it requires that all “assault weapons” be in use for lawful purposes.

This one paragraph by the court stopped me in my tracks. They are working overtime to keep these laws from being overturned.

The reason this is important to us, is that this is not the only court that is using this to uphold infringements.

Arguments: Still not an “arm”

B.L.U.F. The last article was suppose to include this but turned into taxes aren’t infringements. I’m going to try and stay on topic with the state’s arguments about why certain things are not arms.


Bullets are not arms

This has been debunked so many times it isn’t even worth addressing. The Supreme Court has ruled that ammunition is considered “arms” under the meaning of the Second Amendment. Any ban of ammunition is an infringement and under Bruen triggers “history and tradition”.

Magazines are not arms

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Arguments: It isn’t within the scope of the Second Amendment

B.L.U.F. In the last post I described the leftist argument that Nuclear Weapons are outside of the scope of the Second Amendment. I submit that they are within the scope of the Second Amendment but that the Supreme Court’s current opinions put them outside the Scope.

This article covers the state attempting to claim that certain arms are not within the scope of the Second Amendment.


Let’s tax guns out of circulation!

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Argument: It is not an “arm” under the Second Amendment?

B.L.U.F. An analysis/opinion of the State’s attempt to move certain arms out from the protection of the Second Amendment.


This is a long running argument from the anti-gun rights people. The gist is always of the “this modern thing didn’t exist in 1791 so it isn’t covered by the second amendment.” These same people are saying this on phones, computers, The Internet, which the firmly believe are covered under the first Amendment, even though those things would not have been known at the time of the founding.

The question is legitimate, so lets take it to an extreme.

Are Nuclear Weapons Protected Arms Under the Second Amendment?

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