Cases

United States, Et al. v. shilling, Commander, Et Al. 24A1030

There is a battle of procedure that takes place in our courts. That is getting to a final result.

If the Supreme Court were to rule in favor of Trump in December 2028, it would not matter that he won. We would have lost.

That would be four years of waiting for a final result.

We watched and are watching this play out in the Second Amendment community. Duncan v. Bonta has been around for almost a decade at this point. It has been through the district court twice, the Ninth Circuit court multiple times, and the Supreme Court at least once.

The case has won at the District and Supreme Court, yet the relief sought by the plaintiff is still out of reach. In March 2025, the Ninth Circuit decided to twist the words of the Supreme Court to find that magazines are not arms and are not protected by the Second Amendment.

The State of California doesn’t care how long this case takes or how much money it costs to litigate. The district court enjoined the law back in 2017-2018. The Ninth stayed the injunction. That stay has remained in effect even now as the case has been remanded to the district court, ordering the district court to rule for the state.

As long as the status of the case leans towards the infringers, they are happy to delay.

To show how real this is, a district judge in New York issued a TRO enjoining the SAFE act (Bruen tantrum law). The state had that appealed within hours, even though a TRO is not appealable. The Second Circuit Stayed the injunction.

It took over a year before the Second Circuit finally ruled against The People and The Constitution, sending it back to the District Court for more litigation before the case can start up the chain to the Supreme Court, again.

Because that stay is in place, most of New York state is a gun free zone.

The left is using the same methods to stop the Trump administration. They do not care if they win or if they lose, as long as it doesn’t happen now.

They go court shopping until they find a court willing to issue a universal injunction, stopping the Article II executive branch.

Once the injunction is in place, they start slow walking things.

The Circuit courts are just as rogue in these locations as the District Courts. They are using the interlocutory state to excuse not staying the injunctions. “Just let it play out in court.”

The leftest Justices on the Supreme Court echo those words, “just let it work its way here through the normal process. There is no reason to rush this.”

This go around, the Trump administration has been ready and has been moving hard and fast. Multiple cases have made it to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court has issued opinions favorable to the Trump administration each time.

How are they favorable? In most of the cases, the Justices have ruled to allow the Trump administration to continue as they had intended, while the case works its way through the courts.

This means that the left is on the wrong side of that snail. They are the ones attempting to get the cases through as fast as they can. And it isn’t working for them.

In the few cases where the Justices have not issued a stay, they have chastised the lower courts or scheduled oral hearings quickly.

The case at hand.

A group of people suffering from gender dysphoria have been given medical release from the military. They sued in federal district court, asking for an injunction, which was granted.

This means that the military does not have the power to determine which service members are medical disqualified from serving.

The Supreme Court issued a stay against that injunction for the duration. The stay will remain in effect until the Supreme Court denies cert OR issues a final opinion.

We are winning, the courts are moving at breakneck speed, and it keeps looking good.

The other thing which is happening, is that the lanuguage of the Court is changing, they are getting less and less polite and more and more pointed in their correcting of the inferior courts.

United States v. Dugan, 2:25-mj-00397, (E.D. Wis. Apr 24, 2025)

All references can be found at United States v. Dugan.

In looking for a good image to use of the Judge, I found an article written in the third person by Hannah Dugan about how wonderful she is and all the good she has done, and that she will not answer any other questions.

She is lawyered up HARD. Which is the only correct thing to do.

The Armed Attorneys described using a lawyer for communications with authorities as “you can’t incriminate yourself when you use a lawyer.” The example the gave went something like:

FBI agent: Do you know Jim Jones?

You: No, I don’t know Jim Jones.

FBI: You’re under arrest for lying to a federal agent.

Why? They have video proof of you interacting with Jim Jones 9 months, 7 days, 14 hours ago at a party where he was introduced to you. Along with 50 other people.

FBI agent: Do you know Jim Jones?

You whisper in your lawyer’s ear: No.

Lawyer: My client disavows knowing Jim Jones.

You walk out free. Your lawyer’s words are hearsay, not an admission or statement by you.

IANAL.

Back to Dugan.

The Charges

18 U.S.C. § 1505 Obstructing or impeding a proceeding before a department or agency of the United States.

18 U.S.C. § 1071 Concealing an individual to prevent his discovery and arrest.

My reading of §1505 is that it wasn’t the judge physically obstructing or impeding, it was that the judge impeded the arrest which impeded the proceeding to get him out of the country. The act of concealing an individual to prevent his arrest is also impeding.

The Internet Lawyer Wanna Be (like I am) are focusing on only one part of the complaint. That seems to be because they can’t defend the other part.

Prosecutor: Mr. V. Illen then used his 9mm Glock to put two rounds into the victim’s head. Killing him.

Mr. Illen: I don’t own no Glock in 9mm, I used a .45. You got to set me free, you made a mistake.

It doesn’t work like that. A single error does not entirely invalidate a charge. There will be parts that people get wrong.

It is also the case that the word “or” has meaning in the law. Impeding is a word like “infringing”, it doesn’t take much to meet the requirements of impeding. It takes more to get to obstructing.

The Charging Document

ECF No 1 is the complaint in this case. The complaint is the charging document.

The Charging Document must contain the name of the accused, the specific crimes allegedly committed, the date, location, and relevant facts surrounding the alleged crime, and a clear and concise statement of the elements of the offense.

This document is what leads to an arrest warrant.

This complaint has a Judge’s signature on it. From this, I will guess that the magistrate judge found probable cause to issue the arrest warrant. In other words, I can’t find the actual arrest warrant.

What was the initiating event?

Eduardo Flores-Ruiz was charged with three counts of Battery, Domestic Abuse, Infliction of Physical Pain or Injury.

In other words, another wife beater.

When he was charged, his identification was transmitted to the federals. ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations were notified and did a records search.

That research found his Alien Registration File (“A-File”). Turns out that Flores-Ruiz was issued a Notice and Order of Expedited Removal on January 16, 2013. He was kicked out of the states into Mexico through the Nogales, Arizona, Port of Entry.

This happened under Obama.

This is an illegal alien that has an order for removal. Who has had all due process afforded him under the Obama DoJ. Who was removed from the country. He then crossed the border illegally, again.

An arrest warrant was issued for Flores-Ruiz by an immigration official.

This is the normal procedure. He had his due process in 2013.

The Feds went to the courthouse to arrest Flores-Ruiz. This is a common procedure.

The arrest warrant for Flores-Ruiz

The two types of warrants that we are used to are “arrest warrants” and “search warrants”. These fall into two different categories, judicial and administrative.

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
— Fourth Amendment

The Constitution does not tell us who issues warrants. This comes from case law.

The Supreme Court, through its case law, has established that it requires a judicial arrest warrant to enter a private location owned by the target of the warrant.

An arrest warrant for you allows the cops to enter your home to arrest you. They cannot search your home under that arrest warrant, but they can observe that which is in plain view.

They cannot enter your mother’s home to arrest you without consent, with just an arrest warrant.

With a judicial search warrant, they can enter the location identified by the search warrant without consent. The search warrant would list you as the thing they are searching for. Once they find you, they can arrest you with an adjacent arrest warrant.

With an administrative arrest warrant, the cops need consent to enter any private location, including your home. This is why you hear about agents waiting outside of courtrooms to affect an arrest. If all they have is an administrative warrant, they can’t legally enter the courtroom (private area) to arrest someone.

The arrest warrant for Flores-Ruiz was an administrative arrest warrant. After he was arrested, he would be able to contest the removal order. No need to send him through a court process.

This warrant does not require the Judge to do a damn thing to help Law Enforcement in arresting Flores-Ruiz.

…hive of scum and villainy…

Six ICE ERO members arrive to arrest Flores-Ruiz. ERO A, CBP A, FBI A and B, DEA A and B. They were in plains clothes.

ERO A and CBP A presented credentials to security guard, stated they were there to make an arrest. The guard passed them on to the Sheriff’s office. The Sheriff’s office requested that the arrest wait until after the completion of the scheduled hearing. This is standard. ERO A and CBP A agreed. They moved to the public hallway outside the courtroom.

Before ERO A and CBP A arrived, FBI A and FBI B had advised the courtroom deputy that they were there to arrest Flores-Ruiz. Again they agreed to wait until after his hearing before the judge.

The deputy notified a shift sergeant at the Sheriff’s Office.

A public defender came out and took pictures of some arrest team members. Fortunately, not all of them were together, so she missed at least one.

Flores-Ruiz arrived and was greeted by his attorney, and then the two entered the courtroom together.

The public defender spoke with the judge’s clerk. She told the clerk there ware ICE agents in the hallway. She described them to the clerk.

The clerk then informed Judge Dugan. Dugan became angry, left the bench to enter her chambers. Flores-Ruiz was in the gallery, waiting for his hearing.

Judge Dugan and another Judge came out into the public hallway to confront the known arrest team members. Dugan was visibly upset, angry, and confrontational. After determining that they were there for a court appearance, she ordered them out of the courthouse. They refused.

She then demanded to see a judicial warrant. They replied they had an administrative warrant. She said that it was no good. They argued that it was within the public areas of the courthouse.

She then ordered the arrest team to the chief judge’s office to talk to him.

The unidentified agents remained on post.

Judge Dugan then proceeded to look for more arrest team members before returning to her chambers.

The team members at the Chief Judge’s office learn that he is not in the building. They are then connected to him via phone.

(It appears that the Chief Judge had no problems with arrests being made in the courthouse, as long as they were done in public areas. It sounds like it was a cordial conversation)

The courtroom deputy reported to the other team members that Judge Dugan was attempting to expedite Flores-Ruiz’s hearing.

Flores-Ruiz was moved from the gallery to the Jury Box. The deputy reports that this is highly unusual.

Flores-Ruiz and his lawyer started to towards the public exit of the courtroom. Judge Dugan then ordered them to come with her. She took them to the “jury door” which leads to a nonpublic area of the courthouse.

Conclusion

This judge actively worked to obstruct and impede the arrest of a wife beating illegal alien. She actively hide him for agents seeking to arrest him.

She broke the law. The government now needs to prove that in a court of law.

canadian attorney clowning around and banging the gavel on his head

“Facilitate” is not “Effectuate”

I’m saddened when I read the blog of somebody I respect, I’m looking at you Divemedic, gets it wrong because it is everywhere.

The inferior district court judge has claimed (lied) that the Supreme Court agreed with him and that the Government had to “Facilitate the return of Abrego-Garcia”. The Supreme Court did not say this.

The Supreme Court used polite court speak to slap this inferior court judge around the block. The judge then decided to take a victory lap because he refused to read the Supreme Court’s ruling correctly.

What does that “polite court speak” require? First, it requires that you respect all parties. Second, it requires you to treat all statements by the lawyers as being truthful. And it requires that you treat any willful error by the inferior courts as being honest mistakes.

The District Court judge ordered the United States Executive Branch (Article II) to “facilitate and effectuate” the return of Abrego-Garcia. The judge was ordering the government to put Abrego-Garcia in his courtroom.

Under the standard legal dictionary meaning, facilitate means “get out of the way, do what you can do to help get this done.” “Effectuate” means “get it fucking done.”

The inferior court judge cannot order the Article II branch of the government to “effectuate” the return of Abrego-Garcia because the US Government does not have control of Abrego-Garcia.

Thus, the “effectuate” becomes an order to the government to start a war or otherwise do diplomatic things at the whim of the court.

Instead of saying, “You are a fucking arrogant worm. What the hell did you think you were doing when you ordered the Article II branch to do things? You are a co-equal branch, you don’t get to determine US policy, that is the job of the Article II branch.” Instead, the Supreme Court said, “We know you couldn’t have meant what you said, so you must clarify what you meant by ‘effectuate’.”

Sort of like when a little guy is starting to square up against a bigger dude and says something nasty.

Little dude, “Your mother wears army boots!”

Big dude, “I think I misunderstood you, you didn’t say my mom wears army boots, did you?”

This particular rogue judge decided to misunderstand. According to the documents that were available to me when I researched this article, the district court judge has not clarified what he meant by “effectuate”.

Instead, he has lied and changed “facilitate” to “effectuate” by claiming the Supreme Court said that the Article II branch must “facilitate the return of Abrego-Garcia”. Nowhere did the Supreme Court say that.

The Supreme Court told the government they had to talk to the judge and provide him with what information the government felt was acceptable to share.

Legal Case Analysis

J.G.G. v. TRUMP, 1:25-cv-00766, (D.D.C. Apr 16, 2025) ECF No. 81

The NPCs will have their marching orders by now. Yesterday it was “Trump is ignoring a 9-0 Supreme Court ruling that he return Garcia”, today it will be “Trump held in contempt of court.”

Since I’m writing this yesterday, we’ll see how good I am at predicting the NPCs.

We need to start on March 15, 2025. The Trump signed an EO designating TDA and MS-13 as terrorist organizations and ordered their removal under the Alien Enemies Act. Five TDA members filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus.

If the writ is granted by the court, the named plaintiffs must be presented to the court, in person, in corpus (body)

That same day, the court granted a TRO forbidding the removal of the named TDA members. The court claims that the plaintiffs (bad guys) have satisfied the four factors governing the issuance of preliminary relief.

The court didn’t bother to show what those arguments are, nor did the court bother to write an opinion to accompany the order. It is reasonable for the TRO to be granted, the order entered, and then later an opinion entered into the record.

The government immediately filed an appeal to the D.C. Circuit.

Later that same day, the 15th, the court decided to extend the TRO to all noncitizens of the in U.S. custody who are subject to removal via the AEA.

The government then appealed the class certification, extending the TRO to all terrorists in U.S. custody.

Lots of back and forth took place, then on the 28th, the court extended the TRO until April 12th. Thus putting a one-month delay on deporting terrorists.

The same day, the government filed an application with the Supreme Court to vacate the orders of the inferior district court.

The first thing to note is that what the district court was a TRO the Supreme Court construed as appealable injunctions. The D.C. Circuit Court has taken all TROs at face value. I.e., not appealable.

The Supreme Court then vacated the TROs on the 7th of April.

As is normal in such situations, the Supreme Court ruled on the narrow question of venue. And that venue is NOT the district court of D.C.

Conclusion

I’m tired of reading this rogue inferior court judge yap. So I’ll wrap it up for y’ll.

The plaintiffs and the court were attempting to stop the Article II executive branch from performing its Constitutional duties and responsibilities.

The court issued a TRO even though the court did not have the jurisdiction to do so nor had they properly analyzed the Winter Factors as applied to this case.

The problem for the government is that judicial orders, in general, must be obeyed. Even if the court issued them erroneously and without proper authority to do so.

The administration learned their lesson. They are no immediately filing appeals when there are tight deadlines. Even an administrative stay gets them out of the contempt trap.

In this case, there was no deadline. The deadline was “now”. Since the government didn’t do what the court told them to do, they can be held in contempt.

Even though the Supreme Court later vacated the self-styled TRO.

This is just lawfare in a different way.

Noem v. Abrego Garcia

We won, again.

These inferior rogue courts lose and the media plays it up as a win.

The short of it, the state (not bad guys) transferred Kilmar Armando Abrego Garcia to the El Salvador “super max”. Garcia was under a court order to be kept in the United States.

Garcia is a bad person. The state says he is a member of MS-18, he claims he is not. He does not appear to have a criminal record outside of being here illegally. He was detained under the Biden Puppet administration.

His transfer was a mistake. The state acknowledges this.

The District Judge issued another of those magic TROs. He overstepped his Article III power when he ordered the Government to facilitate and effectuate the return of [Garcia] to the United States by no later than 11:59PM on Monday, April 7.

To understand this win, it is necessary to understand the power of a court. When a court gives an order, it must be followed or the court can find you in contempt. Being in contempt can cause people to be arrested.

In this particular case, I believe it is Kristi Noem who would have been held in contempt.

The TRO uses two different terms with different legal meanings. The first is to “facilitate”. This is telling the Government to work with El Salvador to get Garcia back. It could be the Government paying money, it could be other diplomatic pressure, or it could be a simple “please give him back.”

The difficulty the Government has is that Garcia is a member of MS-13. Under El Salvador law, this means he is a terrorist. As a terrorist in El Salvador, he will be detained in their super max under their laws.

Under the facilitate requirement, as long as the Government was working to get Garcia returned to the United States, they were within the boundaries of the TRO.

The second term, “effectuate” is different. This is a get-it-done requirement. This requires that Garcia be back in the United States before midnight on the 7th. If the Government does not have Garcia back in the United States by that deadline, they will be in contempt.

Whatever the full reasons might be for the state not wanting Garcia back, it is unreasonable to expect the state to negotiate the return of Garcia and to have him back in the states within the deadline given by the court.

Chief Justice Roberts quashed this TRO without committing the Court. He issued an administrative stay. Because that stay took the case past the midnight deadline, there was no more threat of contempt.

Having made it past the deadline, the Court then issued an order today.

The application is granted in part and denied in part, subject to the direction of this order. Due to the administrative stay issued by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, the deadline imposed by the District Court has now passed. To that extent, the Government’s emergency application is effectively granted in part and the deadline in the challenged order is no longer effective. The rest of the District Court’s order remains in effect but requires clarification on remand. The order properly requires the Government to “facilitate” Abrego Garcia’s release from custody in El Salvador and to ensure that his case is handled as it would have been had he not been improperly sent to El Salvador. The intended scope of the term “effectuate” in the District Court’s order is, however, unclear, and may exceed the District Court’s authority. The District Court should clarify its directive, with due regard for the deference owed to the Executive Branch in the conduct of foreign affairs. For its part, the Government should be prepared to share what it can concerning the steps it has taken and the prospect of further steps. The order heretofore entered by THE CHIEF JUSTICE is vacated.
— 604 U.S. ___ (2025) 24A949 Justice Sotomayor

Yep, the district court was just slapped down for overreaching its power.

The government is no longer required to return Garcia, they are required to work towards getting him back. Meanwhile, they can continue the court case at the district level, which might end with Garcia staying in El Salvador.

The government is only required to share, what it can, about the steps they are taking to facilitate the return of Garcia.

“We’ve scheduled a meeting with the representative of El Salvador.” Which is 4 weeks from now. They can slow walk this thing.

SCOTUS Watch

Watching The Supreme Court is always frustrating. There is a tendency for things to take a long time.

David Snope filed a petition for writ of certiorari on September 23, 2024. This will be the third or fourth time he has requested a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court.

It has been granted once, the ruling of the Fourth Circuit court was vacated, and the case was remanded back down to the Fourth for a do-over in light of Bruen.

In November 2024, we were hoping that this case and Ocean State Tactical would both be granted cert. It did not happen.

If cert had been granted by January 16th, the case would have had oral arguments in the fall, with the opinion issuing in August.

As things sit, we might not hear the outcome of this case, if granted cert, until the fall of 2026.

But there are things afoot here.

First, the court heard Bondi v. Vanderstok and published their opinion on March 26th. This was not a direct Second Amendment Challenge, it was more of an administrative challenge. We did not win. Both Alito and Thomas dissented.

Mexico’s lawfare case was heard. We will have an opinion on that before the end of the 2024-2025 term. This is a case where the Supreme Court can slap down the lower courts for abusing the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act.

Snope is in regard to Maryland’s “assault weapons” ban. It is one of the many cases where the inferior courts have said things of the sort of “well, some arms aren’t arms under the protection of the Second Amendment.”

Another case, with a docket that looks almost the same, is Ocean State Tactical challenging Rhode Island’s magazine ban. Here, the inferior courts have declared that magazines aren’t really arms under the Second Amendment.

A third case has shown up on the radar.

Antonyuk II is a Second Amendment challenge to New York State’s Bruen tantrum response bill.

The heart of this is New York designating almost every part of the state a sensitive place. Even though Bruen explicitly said that the state couldn’t declare Manhattan a sensitive place, just because there were cops and people there.

All three of these cases are being discussed by the justices, again, this Friday. If we get lucky, we will hear some movement on Monday.

At this point, my tea leaves are missing, my crystal ball has clouded up, and the wife won’t let me sacrifice a chicken to read its entrails.

I haven’t a clue what the justices are going to do. I am holding out hope.

Bondi v. Vanderstock 604 U.S. ___ (2025)

This is an outcome that I disagree with.

This was a 7-2 option in favor of the state (the bad guys).

Thomas wrote a great dissent, I agree with him about the correct outcome.

Alito did a better job of explaining why the court got it wrong.

On the record here, I would not hold that respondents agreed that the Salerno test should apply. The Court relies on the use of the term “facial” in their complaints, but that characterization of their challenges did not constitute agreement with the proposition that a facial challenge to a regulation must satisfy the Salerno test. And in fact respondents never conceded that point. They did not address the issue at all in their briefs, and at no point during the lengthy oral argument in this case were they asked about that question. Holding that they conceded the point is unwarranted and extremely unfair. And in any event, we should adjudicate a facial challenge under the right test regardless of the parties’ arguments. See Moody v. NetChoice, LLC, 603 U. S. 707, 779–780 (2024) (ALITO, J., concurring in judgment).
— Bondi v. Vanderstock, Alito dissenting

Emphasis added.

Facial challenges that require the Salerno test are the most difficult to win. The challengers must prove there is no case in which the regulation is legal (or constitutional).

This is what happened in Rahimi. The court found that §922(g)(8) withstood a facial challenge because a person who had been found to be a violent danger to others could be temporarily disarmed.

The Court found that there was a tradition of disarming violent persons in the late 1700s. That the disarmament could only be temporary, and it had to be properly adjudicated.

Because of the very limited scope they found, the law survives the facial challenge.

By extension, a lifetime loss of Second Amendment protected rights runs against the opinion in Rahimi.

Here, the state slipped in a statement about Salerno. The respondents (good guys) didn’t feel it needed a response, so they didn’t respond.

The majority of the Court then took this as the respondents agreeing that Salerno should control.

Now that Salerno attaches, all the state need do is find ONE example where the regulation is acceptable.

In this case, they used an example, provided by the state, of a frame that required two plastic tabs clipped and filed, and a few holes drilled. Something any of you should be capable of doing in 10 to 15 minutes.

The other was a complete kit which contained everything to assemble a firearm. The time to assemble was listed as around 21 minutes.

As Alito points out, this means that those two are firearms, as defined by the GCA of 1968. It doesn’t say anything about the rest of the frames and receivers out there.

Regardless, background checks are unconstitutional, in my opinion.


This is 12 hours late. I am working a hard deadline for a client that has to be able to handle tariffs correctly by April 2nd. Sorry about that.

Bouarfa v. Mayorkas, (U.S.)

Back in the depths of time, a foreign national wanted to become a U.S. Citizen. He married a young woman who was a U.S. Citizen, living in the U.S.

He received his visa to come to America.

When enough time had passed, he asked his wife to sponsor him to become a U.S. citizen. She did not want to. He offered her $5000 to do so. She refused, they divorced and he left the country.

This happens more often than you might think. It happened to a friend of mine.

She wasn’t a beautiful woman, she was very plain. A man from the Middle East in the US on a student visa “fell in love” with her. He wined and dined her. Treated her in ways nobody else had.

They got married. He got his green card. They had a beautiful girl together. She sponsored him for citizenship. He became a U.S. Citizen.

He then divorced her, took their kid back to his home country. Married the girl who had been promised to him before he came to the US.

In the case of Miss Bouarfa:

Amina Bouarfa is a U. S. citizen who married Ala’a Hamayel, a noncitizen and Palestinian national. They have three young children, all of whom are U. S. citizens. A few years after they married, Bouarfa fled a visa petition on Hamayel’s behalf.

USCIS initially approved the petition. But two years later, the agency sent Bouarfa a Notice of Intent to Revoke its approval. The agency informed Bouarfa that it had uncovered evidence suggesting that, nearly a decade earlier, her husband had entered into a marriage for the purpose of evading immigration laws. According to the agency, during an interrogation, Hamayel’s ex-wife had stated that her marriage with Hamayel had been “fraudulent” and that she had asked him for $5,000 before fling a visa petition on his behalf. App. to Pet. for Cert. 14a. The agency told Bouarfa that, had it been aware of this evidence at the time it reviewed her visa petition, it never would have approved it.
Bouarfa v. Mayorkas, 2024 604 U.S. 6

Miss Bouarfa appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which agreed with the state, his visa stayed revoked. She then appealed to the Federal District Court, claiming the state lacked sufficient evidence to support their determination.

The state got the case dismissed. 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) has this to say:

  1. Denials of discretionary relief
    Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of title 28, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, and except as provided in subparagraph (D), and regardless of whether the judgment, decision, or action is made in removal proceedings, no court shall have jurisdiction to review

    1. any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section 1182(h), 1182(i), 1229b, 1229c, or 1255 of this title, or
    2. any other decision or action of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security, other than the granting of relief under section 1158(a) of this title.

— 8 U.S.C. §1252(a)(2)

They appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court, which affirmed the inferior court’s ruling. His visa was still revoked.

It concluded that the text of § 1155 “makes clear that the Secretary’s authority to revoke the approval of a petition is discretionary.” Id., at 1162. In the court’s view, it made no difference that the agency rested its revocation on a determination that would have required the agency to deny the petition in the first instance. “[N]othing in the statute,” the court reasoned, “requires the Secretary to revoke the approval of a petition in any circumstance, even when the Department later determines that the approval was in error.” Ibid.
id. at 12–13

The question the Supreme Court chose to resolve:

Whether federal courts have jurisdiction to review the Secretary’s revocation of the agency’s prior approval of a visa petition. 601 U. S. 1166 (2024).3 Bouarfa challenges the Secretary’s revocation on the assumption that the fact that her husband is not in removal proceedings does not affect the jurisdictional analysis.
id. at 13
The problem for Bouarfa’s argument is that § 1154(c) nowhere suggests that its command extends beyond the point of approval. Nothing in the provision mentions revocation. And we need not guess in what situations Congress wanted the Secretary to revoke the agency’s approval, because Congress answered that question directly: The Secretary “may” do so whenever he “deems” there to be “good and sufficient cause.” § 1155. This specific grant of discretion to revoke forecloses the argument that Congress silently mandated revocation in certain situations.
id. at 16
In § 1155, Congress granted the Secretary broad authority to revoke an approved visa petition “at any time, for what he deems to be good and sufficient cause.” Such a revocation is thus “in the discretion of” the agency. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). Where § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) applies, then, it bars judicial review of the Secretary’s revocation under § 1155. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

It is so ordered.
id. at 19

Conclusion

Once the back and forth with the inferior courts is completed, Khalil will lose.

The Supreme Court found, 9-0, that the Secretary has the choice to revoke any visa or green card for anything he feels is sufficient. Judicial review is not allowed under U.S. Law.

The ONLY challenge they would have is a Constitutional challenge, which they have not really made.

Legal Case Analysis

Khalil v. Joyce, 3:25-cv-01963, (D.N.J.)

What is the judicial branch of the U.S. Government?

The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
Bouarfa v. Mayorkas, 2024 604 U.S. 6

There is only one court defined in the Constitution, all the others are created by Congress and are inferior to the Supreme Court.

The Congress can establish courts, which implies that they can delete courts. This has happened in the past, I believe. We have been looking to split the Ninth Circuit into multiple circuits for several years now.

Neither the Congress nor the President can reduce the salary for Judges. They can only increase their salaries.

There are two ways to remove a federal judge from inferior court: 1) Impeach them, 2) Find that they are not exhibiting “good behaviour”.

While the Constitution established the Supreme Court and authorized inferior courts, it doesn’t, explicitly, say what authority over the other two branches it has.

The President has the power of the veto. He has command of the military and the tools required to fulfill his responsibilities as the head of the executive branch.

The Congress has the power of the purse and the ability to create laws. They can override a presidential veto.

Our government was set up to be at odds with itself. To be inefficient in creating laws. No man’s home or wallet is safe when Congress is in session.

The power of the Court came when they took it in Marbury. They didn’t justify that power grab under the Constitution. They simply declared that it is the job of the courts to say what the law is.

As part of that task, they are now empowered (authorized) to judge the Constitutionality of any law.

The Supreme Court has put guard rails on that power. While we heard it in Bruen and in Heller, it is a consistent message, first look at the plain text of the Constitution. If the proposed conduct implicates the plain text of the Constitution, then the burden shifts to the Government to show this Nation’s historical tradition of equivalent regulation.

Yes, that sort of language is in many Supreme Court opinions, not just Second Amendment Opinions. Which is part of the reason the legal people of the Second Amendment Community get upset with rogue inferior courts.

The Trump Administration’s Attack on Judges

Maybe we should say, “rogue, inferior court, judges.” These are judges, sometimes making up an entire court, that seem to feel that they have the power to overturn presidential orders.

Unfortunately, these judges step outside the guard rails constantly.

Consider just one question, “Does the President have the Constitutional authority to hire and fire personal within the executive branch?”

When we look at the plain text of the Constitution, we find that he does have the authority to hire. Sometimes that requires the Advice and Consent of the Senate. Other times it does not.

With the authority to hire comes the ancillary authority to fire. This is the same as the First Amendment’s “freedom of the press” including the right of the press to purchase ink and to be free of targeted taxation.

Trump 2.0 came into office knowing that he would be subject to lawfare. The left has already played that hand.

When I read the filings of the state (good guys), it is obvious that they were prepared for these court cases. They have been extraordinarily careful to make sure they follow the court’s orders without letting the court win.

Battle Is Waged

There seems to be credible evidence that there are people in congress that are looking to start impeachment proceedings against those judges that they feel are going rogue. Chief Justice Roberts issued a statement that impeachment wasn’t the correct path to follow when a court’s ruling goes against you. Still, the undertones suggest that impeachments are coming.

Some lawyers are suggesting going after the good behavior aspect. If the judge is not staying within the guard rails created by the Supreme Court, they are not exhibiting good behavior. This means they can be removed. Is there good case law for this? I do not know. I suspect there is not.

You are welcome to read this article from the University of Notre Dame.

Regardless, there are judges out there that are seeing that they are getting into the “FO” stage of the equation.

Enter Judge Jesse M. Furman

Judge Furman is a member of the Southern District of New York District Court. When Khalil was detained, then transported before being deported, he was the lucky judge to get the case.

The case is a writ of habeas corpus.

A writ of habeas corpus orders the custodian of an individual in custody to produce the individual before the court to make an inquiry concerning his or her detention, to appear for prosecution (ad prosequendum) or to appear to testify (ad testificandum). State courts may issue such writs to prisoner custodians to produce federal prisoners.
— U.S. Marshals Service

The gist, in this case, is that the lawyers for Khalil want him in S.D.N.Y, and they want the court to have power over him. Currently, the federal government has power over him.

Unfortunately for Khalil, the state hit hard and fast. They detained Khalil, took him to the ICE Field Office in Manhattan for processing. The ICE Field Office does not have facilities for holding prisoners for more than 12 hours. Since he couldn’t hold him there, so they transferred him.

He was transferred to the Elizabeth Detention Facility in Newark, New Jersey. Normally, this is where he would have been held until deported or released.

But, the Elizabeth Detention Facility was experiencing and continues to experience a bedbug issue that prevented [them] from accepting detainees as full transfers. In short, he couldn’t stay there.

This was known before Khalil was detained. They had transport ready and Khalil was on his way to the Louisiana Detention Facility in Jena, Louisiana shortly after he arrived in New Jersey.

This was happening so rapidly that the Judge is talking about where Khalil was at any particular minute. In some cases, he was removed from jurisdictions only a few minutes before court orders would have stopped the transfer.

Now Khalil is in Louisiana. The S.D.N.Y. did not have jurisdiction when the case was opened. That would have been in the District of New Jersey. By the time everything was sorted out, he was in the Western District of Louisiana.

This judge could claim he had jurisdiction and demand the return of Khalil. This would be fought, and is being fought. He is unlikely to win on the merits. It could be years before the Supreme Court makes a final decision. During that time, Khalil would be behind bars.

If the judge dismissed the case, his earlier TRO would be vacated and Khalil would be deported.

If the judge transferred the case to the W.D. of Louisiana, it is likely that the courts in that jurisdiction would not be issuing orders overriding the President.

Here is the thing. The Trump admin is going to put the same motions for dismissal or transfer in front of the judge in New Jersey.

How does a judge in New York decide that they don’t have jurisdiction because the person wasn’t in the district when the case was filed, believe that the case belongs in a jurisdiction where the complaint was never filed and where the person is currently being detained?

Bluntly, I think the judge in New York took a look at what was happening and decided, “I don’t want any part of this mess.” Then punted.

Antonyuk v. James (U.S. 24-795)

This case is distributed for Conference on 3/28/2025. This adds an interesting twist on our Second Amendment cases before the Supreme Court.

Could this be combined with the Snope (assault weapon bans) and Ocean State Tactical (magazine bans)?

This case is where New York State’s Bruen tantrum replaced “proper cause” with “good moral character” and then proceeded to make almost all of New York State a sensitive place.

We are living in interesting times.