Cases

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The Rabbit Hole of Legal Speak

The district courts have been attacking the Trump administration wherever possible. Many have overstepped their authority to intrude on the Article II executive.

A judge in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts decided that he was a final arbitrator of United States foreign policy. To that end, he issued a preliminary injunction stopping the deportation of criminal illegal aliens to third-party countries.

The criminal is detained in the United States. He is taken before an administrative judge, where he is given full due process. The judge can order the criminal released into our country with orders to report for further legal actions. He can decide that the person is not a criminal alien, and turn him loose or to other authorities. Or he can issue a deportation order.

At times, the criminal is not just here illegally, he has committed some other crime. In those cases, they are given a full trial. When they are found guilty, the judge can sentence them according to sentencing guidelines. After serving their sentence, they are then deported. The Article III judge will have ordered them deported, as part of their sentence.

In the alternative, the judge can just deport them. Make them someone else’s problem.

When we deport somebody, the rules say that they should be deported to the country of origin or to the last country they came through to reach the United States.

I’m not breaking it down. Some people hold multiple citizenships. Some people are citizens of their birth country and then move and become citizens in another country. Just assume that they are being sent to the correct country of origin.

Unfortunately, some of these criminal, illegal, aliens are nasty pieces of work. Many countries will refuse entry to people that they deem to be undesirable.

That includes many countries that feel that somebody convicted of murder is undesirable. Regardless of their citizenship.

My understanding is that under international law, a country is required to accept a deportee who is a citizen of their country.

As we well know, international law doesn’t really mean much. Countries have and do refuse entry to people that commit heinous crimes.

Having all of that in hand, let’s look at the facts of this case, according to Sotomayor.

The person being deported, O.C.G., had a removal order in place. He was being returned to his origin country, Guatemala.

When he learned of this, he begged an Immigration Judge to grant “withholding of removal to Guatemala”. Ok. This means that the next place he can be deported to is the last country he was in. Namely, Mexico.

Now, Sotomayor says that the Immigration Judge granted that withholding of removal to Guatemala and not to Guatemala and Mexico because there was no removal order to Mexico.

There is no record of why the Judge did this, only Sotomayor’s statement. The Judge knew that O.C.G. didn’t want to go to Mexico. He could have granted a withholding of removal to Mexico at the same time.

The judge did not.

Under the Trump administration, they looked at what they had. They had a legal removal order. It is legal to send him back to Mexico or Guatemala by statue, but he can’t be sent to Guatemala.

Bingo, he’s now on his way to Mexico.

When he arrived in Mexico, they said, “We don’t want your ass here.” and promptly deported him to Guatemala. It appears that there was no Immigration Judge in Mexico willing to grant a withholding of removal to Guatemala. Poor O.C.G.

From someplace in Guatemala, O.C.G. reached out to lawyers in the United States to start a class action suit to stop the administration from deporting criminal aliens to third-party countries.

Lacking in Sotomayor’s dissent is anything about O.C.G.’s criminal record. Nor was there was no evidence in the record that O.C.G. suffered any torture in Guatemala.

There is only O.C.G.’s claims.

The Immigration Judge who granted the withholding of removal found that O.C.G. was likely to suffer if deported to Guatemala. Therefore, the United States did not. The United States has no say on what Mexico does with its criminal illegal aliens.

This district judge feels that the United States is responsible for making sure nothing bad happens to these criminals after they are kicked out of our country.

The case is, DHS v. D.V.D. et al., No. 24A1153 606 U.S. ____ (2025).

Nguyen v. Bonta, No. 24-2035, Doc. 54 (9th Cir.)

(Feature Image is Raymond M. DiGuiseppe, who argued the case before the Ninth Circuit merits panel)

This was a big case with all the big names involved. We had Chuck Michel and Anna Barvir from Michel & Associates PC. If there is a Second Amendment case happening in California, they are likely to be there. The NRA was there. Erin Murphy, Paul Clement, Matthew Rowen, and Nicholas Gallagher from Clement & Murphy. You should know their names, think Bruen.

Regardless, Raymond is the one that argued and ran this case.

This was a unanimous opinion by all three judges. This is great. It is a win for The People. The 1 gun per 30 days is currently enjoined. The people of The People’s Republic of California have one of the rights the rest of the citizens of these United States enjoy.

Is this judgment going to stand? I do not believe so. The People have had a few wins in the district courts of California, and we have had a few wins with merits panels of the Ninth Circuit. In every case, the Ninth Circuit has then agreed to hear the case en banc and reversed the merits panel.

According to one of the judges that sits on the Ninth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit is over 150 to 0 against The People in Second Amendment cases.

History

In 1999, the state of California enacted a one-gun-a-month law. The law banned the purchase of more than one “concealable handgun” per 30-day period. In 2019, the law was extended to “handgun, semiautomatic centerfire rifle, completed frame or receiver, or firearm precursor part”.

You just have to love that made up term “firearm precursor part”. Does that mean a billet of 6061? Does it mean a raw forging of aluminum? Does it mean an 80% lower? Yeah, when does it stop being a pipe from The Home Depot, and it becomes a firearm precursor part?

The plaintiffs in the district case became Appellees at the circuit level are the good guys. They wanted to buy more than one firearm per month. The case is a facial challenge to the law.

The judges looked at this case “de novo”, or as if it were new. Because the case was a facial challenge, they only considered the text of the statute. It is the burden of the plaintiffs (good guys) to establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the law would be valid.

The Analysis

The Second Amendment guarantees that “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const. amend. II. This provision, coupled with the Fourteenth Amendment, “protect[s] an individual right to keep and bear arms for self-defense.” Bruen, 597 U.S. at 17; see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628–30 (2008); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767–68, 791 (2010). The analysis of a Second Amendment challenge is rooted in the constitutional text and in our nation’s history and tradition of firearm regulation. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 24. We first ask whether “the Second Amendment’s plain text” covers the regulated conduct at issue. Id. If it does, “the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct.” Id. That presumption can be overcome only if “‘historical precedent’ from before, during, and even after the founding evinces a comparable tradition of regulation.” Id. at 27 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 631).
Nguyen, et al. v. Bonta, et al., No. 24-2036, slip op. at 7 (9th Cir.)

This is correctly stated and a good summary. It is at this point where most of the rogue, inferior, courts go off the rails.

Next, we consider whether the plain text of the Second Amendment protects the regulated conduct just identified. Bruen, 597 U.S. at 24. It is well established that the Second Amendment’s guarantee of “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms,” U.S. Const. amend. II, protects “the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 635; see also McDonald, 561 U.S. at 780. This “core Second Amendment right … ‘wouldn’t mean much’ without the ability to acquire arms.” Teixeira v. County of Alameda, 873 F.3d 670, 677 (9th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (quoting Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 704 (7th Cir. 2011), abrogated on other grounds by Bruen, 597 U.S. 1). Thus, we have “consistently held that the Second Amendment … ‘protects ancillary rights necessary to the realization of the core right to possess a firearm for self-defense.’” B&L Prods., Inc. v. Newsom, 104 F.4th 108, 118 (9th Cir. 2024) (quoting Teixeira, 873 F.3d at 677), cert. denied — S. Ct. —, 2025 WL 1211774 (2025). While we have not defined “the precise scope” of protected ancillary rights, we have held “that the plain text of the Second Amendment only prohibits meaningful constraints on the right to acquire firearms.” Id. (quoting Teixeira, 873 F.3d at 678) (emphasis added).
id. at 8–9

Teixeira was decided in 2017, against The People. Yet, it is quoted multiple times. Ezell v City of Chicago, in front of the Seventh Circuit court in 2011, was also a loss for The People. Both cases preceded Bruin and as such need to be reanalyzed in light of the Bruen analysis. In other words, they are likely bad law.

They did not cite to Minneapolis Star & Tribune C v. Minnesota. This is because that case is a Supreme Court opinion and was a much stronger indictment for not messing with The People’s rights via restricting ancillary actions. In that case, the state (bad guys) put a tax on the ink purchased by large newspapers.

The phrase “meaningful constraints” is where this opinion starts to go sideways. Because they are quoting case law from before Bruen they are sneaking in “interest balancing”. The state does not get to decide what is or is not a “meaningful constraint.”

They don’t get to because they always extend it to far. Is a $200 tax on a firearm accessory that much of a constraint? Is a requirement for government permission to purchase a firearm accessory? Or to ask for permission to move it across state lines?

According to the federal government, it is not a meaningful constraint. Nor does the state of California think it is a meaningful constraint.

This makes the statement erroneous. This is why I call foul on citing to bad case law to support current cases.

Making a Summary Because I’m tired

California argued that the Second Amendment doesn’t guarantee a right to possess multiple firearms, and even if it did, restricting the frequency of firearm purchases is not a meaningful constraint.

This panel swatted that one down. They point out that if the state was right and because things apart from firearms are arms. The state could argue that if a person owned a knife could be banned from purchasing a firearm.

They get the plain text section right.

Unfortunately, only in part. They claim that delays that serve presumptively valid purposes are constitutional but that in this particular case, the law purpose of the delay is the delay.

They found that there is no history or tradition of meter the exercise of a constitutional right.

Of course, the infringers use the “nuanced approach” argument. That phrase now makes me sick. It tells me the bad guys are about to lie through their teeth and expect me to smile.

Here the court reaches the correct conclusion but for the wrong reasons. This can be bad for the Second Amendment rights of the People.

The nuanced approach only applies to things that are not bans. This is a ban, a metering of rights. In Heller, the Supreme Court found that there was no history or tradition to support firearm bans. This means that a one-per-month ban is unconstitutional, period.

The merits panel then spends a half dozen pages of electrons to find other reasons to find no tradition.

Conclusion

It is a win. I’ll take it.

It is not good case law. They did not create a general understanding of “Plain text” and they did not do a correct history and tradition analysis.

This suggests, to me, that this opinion will be cited by the anti-gun people in the future, in negative ways.

Regardless, this opinion will not stand. It will get overturned by the en banc panel. The Supreme Court is unlikely to grant cert if they request cert.

Close-up Of An Open Law Book And Wooden Mallet In Courtroom

My Dicta Good, Your Dicta Bad

Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amend­ment is not unlimited. … courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever pur­pose.
Nguyen, et al. v. Bonta, et al., No. 24-2036, slip op. at 7 (9th Cir.)

This bit of text is quoted in almost every case where the state is defending their blatant infringements.

They still use this citation, even post Bruen. After Bruen, they added a ⁣more nuanced approach.

What these two quotes have in common is that they are “dicta”.

Dicta is short for obiter dictum. It refers to statements made by a judge in a legal opinion which are not essential to the decision of the case.

What is essential is the holding.

Part of the problem is that the superior courts would rather not resolve the same issues over and over again. They want a one and done case.

The core holding in Heller was that the Second Amendment was an individual right. As such, any ban of a class of firearm, defacto or not, was unconstitutional.

That’s it. The entire discussion on dangerous and unusual, in common use for lawful purposes, and “this is how you perform Second Amendment jurisprudence” is dicta.

Because it is “just” dicta, the inferior courts can choose to ignore it. Or pick and choose which parts of dicta they wish to use.

The rogue inferior courts will use the “not unlimited” to search for the boundaries. Then they will find that the particular law is outside the boundaries of the Second Amendment.

The Bruen opinion introduced more dicta. These dicta were directed orders to the inferior courts. No more two-step shuffle. No more means balancing.

The inferior courts were told, clearly, that the process of picking a level of scrutiny, and then applying a balancing procedure was unacceptable.

They were told to first look at the plain text of the Constitution. The very same language the Court has been using for decades, if not centuries. These inferior courts have shown that they are perfectly capable of reading the plain text of every part of the Constitution, except the Second Amendment.

Once the conduct “touches fingers” with the Second Amendment, the burden shifts to the state to show that their regulation is a match for this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.

In Rahimi, they said that a person can only be temporarily denied their Second Amendment protected rights. The inferior courts then proceeded to decide that a permanent loss of Second Amendment protected rights was Constitutional, when applied to anybody who could have been sentenced to more than a year in jail/prison.

Finally, Mexico’s allegations about the manufacturers’ “design and marketing decisions” add nothing of consequence. Brief for Respondent 23. As noted above, Mexico here focuses on the manufacturers’ production of “military style” assault weapons, among which it includes AR-15 rifles, AK-47 rifles, and .50 caliber sniper rifles. See supra, at 6; App. to Pet. for Cert. 121a. But those products are both widely legal and bought by many ordinary consumers. (The AR-15 is the most popular rifle in the country. See T. Gross, How the AR-15 Became the Bestselling Rifle in the U. S., NPR (Apr. 20, 2023.) The manufacturers cannot be charged with assisting in criminal acts just because Mexican cartel members like those guns too. The same is true of firearms with Spanish-language names or graphics alluding to Mexican history. See supra, at 6. Those guns may be “coveted by the cartels,” as Mexico alleges; but they also may appeal, as the manufacturers rejoin, to “millions of law-abiding Hispanic Americans.” Tr. of Oral Arg 80; Reply Brief 20. That leaves only the allegation that the manufacturers have not attempted to make guns with non-defaceable serial numbers. See supra, at 6. But the failure to improve gun design in that way (which federal law does not require) cannot in the end show that the manufacturers have “join[ed] both mind and hand” with lawbreakers in the way needed to aid and abet. Direct Sales, 319 U. S., at 713.
id. at 8–9

This is also dicta. This paragraph was written by Justice Kagan. Justice Sotomayor wrote something similar in Rahimi, I believe. Where she also admitted that the AR-15 was in common use for legal purposes.

After S&W v. Mexico was decided, many of the plaintiffs (good guys) filed notices with their respective courts, pointing them to the opinion. The gist of many of these notifications were, “The plain text is implicated. The burden shifts to the government to prove their ban is justified by this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The Supreme Court stated that a firearm or class of firearms can only be banned if it is both dangerous and unusual. If a firearm or class of firearm is in common use, it is not unusual and cannot be banned. Justice Kagan said AR-15s are in common use.”

Well, the replies to those filings have started to come in. In a shocking turn of events, the infringers are now arguing that the Justice Kagan quote is “just dicta” and should be discarded. That it is just meaningless noise.

(But please remember that my dicta, “not unlimited”, cannot be discarded. It was put into a Supreme Court opinion.)

Legal Case Analysis

Barnett v. Raoul, 24-3060 7th cir

The state has stepped up and opened their mouth in an Amicus brief in —Nguyen, et al. v. Bonta, et al., No. 24-2036, slip op. at 7 (9th Cir.) (not a good cite). The gist of the case is that the state of Illinois had a Bruen tantrum and created a new assault weapon and magazine ban.

Now the United States DoJ is sticking their oar in the water. Ugh.

President Donald J. Trump has instructed his Administration to “protect the Second Amendment rights of all Americans.” Executive Order No. 14,206, Protecting Second Amendment Rights, 90 Fed. Reg. 9503 (Feb. 7, 2025). Attorney General Pamela Bondi has likewise instructed the Department of Justice “to use its full might to protect the Second Amendment rights of law-abiding citizens.” Memo. from the U.S. Att’y Gen., Second Amendment Enforcement Task Force (Apr. 8, 2025).

Yeah, I’ll believe that when the cows come home.

The United States has strong interests in ensuring that these questions are correctly resolved; Now, isn’t that weasel words?

that the Second Amendment is not treated as a second-class right; and that law-abiding Americans in this Circuit are not deprived of the full opportunity to enjoy the exercise of their Second Amendment rights.

Wait, WHAT?

Three years ago, the Supreme Court issued a landmark decision meant to break a habit developed by some States of treating the Second Amendment as “a second-class right, subject to an entirely different body of rules than the other” constitutional rights. New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 70 (2022) (citation omitted).

Yes, the Supreme Court did say, in Heller and Bruen that the Second Amendment isn’t a second class right.

Regrettably, not every State got the message. Just a few months after Bruen, Illinois outlawed some of the most commonly used rifles and magazines in America via a so-called “assault weapons” ban. In doing so, Illinois violated the Supreme Court’s clear directive that States cannot prohibit arms that are “in common use” by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 624 (2008).

Exactly, Illinois passed a “Bruen tantrum bill”. They did not get the message.

…the key question under the Second Amendment’s text is whether the banned semiautomatic firearms are “Arms”

Many of them—including AR-15s—are. The term “Arms,” as used in the Second Amendment, describes the category of weapons that an individual would wear, bear, or carry for offensive or defensive action in case of conflict with other people. Heller, 554 U.S. at 581. Thus, the Second Amendment “extends, prima facie, to all instruments that constitute bearable arms.” Id. at 582. And it protects not “only those arms in existence in the 18th century,” but also “those that were not in existence at the time of the founding.” Ibid.

Well, Doh, of course AR-15s are “Arms” under the plain text.

This brief focuses on AR-15s, the “paradigmatic example” of the type of firearm banned by the Act. But to be clear, the Act is, in the United States’ view, unconstitutional to the extent it bans the possession of any firearms (not just AR-15s) that are in common use by law-abiding citizens for lawful reasons. For purposes of this amicus brief, however, the United States does not challenge the district court’s findings that certain firearms banned by the Act, such as .50 caliber rifles and pistols, do not fall within that category. Barnett v. Raoul, 756 F. Supp. 3d 564, 628 (S.D. Ill. 2024). But cf. Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos, No. 23-1141, 605 U.S. __, 2025 WL 1583281, at *8 (U.S. June 5, 2025) (“.50 caliber sniper rifles … are both widely legal and bought by many ordinary consumers”).
— Footnote 2

Please note that the quote comes from the S&W v. Mexico was written by Justice Kagan. In other words, we now have two lefty Justices writing things that are pro-Second Amendment.

… Indeed, it is hard to imagine how anyone fairly applying Heller’s definition of “Arms”—instead of redefining it—could conclude otherwise. Cf. Harrel, 144 S. Ct. at 2492-93 (statement of Thomas, J.); Bevis, 85 F.4th at 1206-07 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

Ok, what happened? The DoJ are the bad guys, aren’t they?

For protected “Arms,” a legislature may only pass “such regulations and limitations” as do not “infringe the right secured and the necessary incidents to the exercise of such right.” Andrews, 50 Tenn. at 179. Courts should generally determine the validity of restrictions on (or regulations regarding) the types of “Arms” that a citizen may possess at the second step of Bruen’s analysis, during which courts must consult our Nation’s “historical tradition of firearm regulation” and determine whether a given restriction or regulation “is consistent with the principles that underpin [that] regulatory tradition.” United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680, 691-92 (2024) (citation omitted).

Exactly, if the plain text of the Second Amendment interacts with the conduct, bearing assault weapons in this case, then the Second Amendment’s protections presumptively apply to that conduct. The state bears the burden of proving a history of historical regulations that are a match.

Furthermore, while many said that Rahimi was bad for The People, it keeps showing up in positive ways in these court cases. Now if the rogue courts would just follow simple instructions.

The DoJ goes on to correctly apply the “in common use” process. The Supreme Court has already done the work of determining what this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulations are in reference to firearm bans. They determined that for an arm to be banned, it must be both dangerous and unusual.

If an arm is in common use among The People, it is not unusual and cannot be banned.

This Second Amendment’s militia-related text, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, thus suggests that the government may not prohibit weapons simply because it considers them “militaristic.” The contrary claim that “militaristic” weapons fall outside its scope wrongly requires reading the prefatory clause entirely out of the Second Amendment.

One of the things the DoJ points out, that I had not noticed, is that these rogue, inferior courts, have decided that Heller severed the Second Amendment’s prefactory clause from its operative clause. These rogue courts were then able to argue that if a weapon was militaristic, the operative clause did not protect it.

This is just BS. The Supreme Court actual recognized that the Second Amendment also protects the right to keep and bear arms for individual self-defense, but also collective self-defense.

Applying that principle to the Act, the Second Amendment protects firearm attachments that are useful to the exercise of the right, including magazines, suppressors, and other firearm attachments that are in common use by law-abiding citizens for lawful reasons. As the D.C. Circuit has held, “[a] magazine is necessary to make meaningful an individual’s right to … self-defense.”

My gosh, the DoJ just said that suppressors are “arms” under the Second Amendment and thus fall under the “in common use” shortcut.

Conclusion

The United States of America Department of Justice just filed one of the most powerful motion, supporting the Second Amendment, I’ve ever read. It calls out the rogue inferior courts. It says that rogue inferior courts are wrong in how they are interpreting the Second Amendment.

In general, parties to a case are careful in their wording to not offend the court. This is why you don’t normally read statements in a motion saying the court got it wrong.

This motion did precisely that. It called out the Seventh Circuit court for intentionally reinterpreting the Supreme Court to get their agenda-driven results.

Smith & Wesson v. Mexico

In a unanimous opinion, delivered by Justice Kagan, the Supreme Court held:

Because Mexico’s complaint does not plausibly allege that the defendant gun manufacturers aided and abetted gun dealers’ unlawful sales of firearms to Mexican traffickers, PLCAA bars the lawsuit
— 605 U.S. ____ (2025)

Thomas and Jackson both wrote concurring opinions. I have not read them yet.

This is a huge win. In just the skim I did, they specifically call out advertising as being irrelevant.

I intend to have an article on Saturday. This case advances Second Amendment jurisprudence.

Angry stone age caveman in animal pelt with long beard waves his prehistoric club in the air while ranting, 3d illustration render

SCOTUS, a rant

During the term, the Supreme Court has multiple conferences. The Friday conference is when they decide which cases will be granted cert, which will be denied, and other issues relating to cases, outside of opinions.

On the following Monday, they publish their order list. This is a list of all the cases they have an action on. Some of those a denial of cert, others are denials of moving forward as somebody that can’t pay filing costs, others are invitations to the federal government to speak up on the case.

The only people in the conferences are the 9 justices. There are no law clerks, no bus boys, no secretaries. It is just the nine of them.

When evaluating a motion for a writ of certiorari, it only takes 4 justices to grant the writ.

A case that is granted cert can be quickly handled by vacating the inferior court’s decision and remanding the case back to the inferior court. This is normally accompanied by instructions to “do it over, right, in light of a recent opinion”.

I would have loved to see the Court GVR Snope with “in light of Heller and Bruen“. Not that it would have done anything when dealing with the Fourth Circuit, but it still would have been an interesting method of dealing with these rogue inferior courts.

If they are not GVRing a case, but simply granting cert, they will schedule oral arguments and set deadlines for all briefs to be filed. They never state a dissent or make a statement when a case is granted cert.

If they deny cert, most times it is a simple list of cases with a short sentence at the end, “the motion for certiorari is denied.

The Snope case is ripe to be heard by the Court. It has been kicking around since 2013. It was one of the cases that was seeking cert while Bruen was seeking cert. It could have been the case to move Second Amendment jurisprudence forward.

The Court did the right thing in taking Bruen. Snope, known as Bianchi at the time, was a simple repeat of Heller. Bruen advanced our cause significantly.

The holding was that the Second Amendment extends outside the home. That is huge. It is much bigger than saying, “It is a gun ban case, we decided it in Heller, you can’t ban guns in common use for legal purposes.”

The Supreme Court only hears 70 or so cases a year. That is across all parts of the legal landscape. First Amendment, Fourth and Fifth amendments, environment and a host of other subjects.

The question becomes twofold, how many Second Amendment cases will the court hear in a term, and what are the best cases to take?

The Supreme Court heard Rahimi in the 2024 term (current term) as well as VanDerStok.

Was Snope the right vehicle for the next major Second Amendment opinion?

Maybe not. If the Court could hear every Second Amendment case presented to them, then yes. This was a slam dunk case for The People.

It would not have advanced Second Amendment jurisprudence in any significant way. It would be a redo of Heller.

Justice Thomas would have written, either as the author of the opinion or in a concurrence, that the plain text is plain, there is no evaluation to do. But it would still just be another Heller.

We have other cases coming forward. My feelings were that an opinion in Snope would have addressed these other cases, but maybe we need to have the court look at sensitive places?

When the Bruen opinion issued, I remember focusing in on “sensitive places”. It was obvious to me that many of the rogue states would laser focus on making as much of their state “sensitive places” as possible. The goal isn’t to make every place illegal for you to carry, it is to make it so legally dangerous that you don’t bother.

Every time something comes up on Craigslist that I want which is in MA, I evaluate it in terms of drive time and danger. Because I have to leave my firearm behind when I travel into Mass. It is painful.

There are two east-west roads near me. One is faster to certain towns in NH. But, it dips into Mass for part of that trip. I refuse to use that route, even if it adds 15 to 30 minutes to trip time.

Now imagine thousands of little “legal guns prohibited” areas in a state. What happens if you’re driving to pick up a rabbit hutch, and you drive past a school. With the way some states work, that could be a felony.

So the Court could be looking for a sensitive places case. Or, one that I would like to see, a reciprocity case? How cool would it be if the court found that whatever requirements my state requires is all it takes for me to be able to carry any state?

I’m disappointed. I never expect anything of Roberts. I was hoping for better from Amy.

This is a war. It is better to not lose this battle and continue to make headway in the Supreme Court.

Boy am I disappointed.

Snope case is dead, Ocean State Tactical is on life support

Today, the Supreme Court denied cert in both Snope and Ocean State Tactical.

Thomas and Kavanaugh wrote dissents. Alito and Gorsuch joined Kavanaugh in his dissent. Amy and John sided with the agenda driven left of the court.

Because Ocean State Tactical is in an interlocutory state, they will have at least another two bites at the apple. If this outcome is any indication, I do not expect a positive result.

On the better news front, Kavanaugh listed several cases that are making their way up the chain and will be or are seeking cert.

Another Win, DOGE v. Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington

UPON CONSIDERATION of the application of counsel for the applicants and the response filed thereto,

IT IS ORDERED that the April 15, 2025, and May 20, 2025 orders of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, case No. 25-cv-511, are hereby stayed pending further order of the undersigned or of the Court.
— Misc. Order 2025-05-23

This case is about slowing down DOGE and the Trump administration. The tool used in this case is Freedom Of Information Act requests for information, otherwise known as FOIA requests.

The name of the organization is, normally, CREW. They started requesting information in December 2024, through the OMB attempting to find out who and what DOGE was. When they had not received a response by January 2025, they requested an expedited FOIA. They filed more FOIA requests and more demands for expedited actions.

On February 20, 2025, they filed suit, alleging that the government wasn’t responding fast enough. They wanted a preliminary injunction requiring full compliance with their request by March 10th.

By March 10th, the court had ordered the government to produce the requested documents in an expedited manner. It looks like court speak of “ASAP”.

By the middle of April, they had a requirement in place for the government to produce 1000 documents per month. Note, OMB believes there are around 108,000 documents and DOGE believes they have 58,000. This is a total of 166,000 documents.

The government has nearly 15 years to produce all the documents requested.

Ok. That’s where things stood as of April 10, 2025.

The government filed a request for stay with the Supreme Court.

Chief Justice Roberts then issued an administrative stay. This means that OMB and DOGE can proceed with document production at a “normal” rate.

Since it is an administrative stay, only a single justice is needed. The entire court can then choose to examine the case and issue an order regarding the request for stay, or they can just leave the administrative stay in place.

It seems a small win, but it is a win.

A.A.R.P v Trump, 605 U.S. ___(2025) No. 24A1007

I wasn’t expecting this opinion this quickly. The Supreme Court heard oral arguments on the 15th, they issued their opinion on the 16th. It is only 24 pages long.

This case has many concurrent issues running through it. It is important to focus on what the opinion actually does, how it does it, and what the legal issues the Court is attempting to resolve.

What the holding is, what it means

The Supreme Court has issued an injunction stopping the deportation of TdA terrorists while the Fifth Circuit Court issues a new opinion. This injunction stands until the Supreme Court issues their opinion in this case after being fully briefed and oral arguments given, OR if the Court denies certiorari, OR neither party appeals from the Fifth Circuit Court.

This Supreme Court Order vacates and remands the case back to the Fifth Circuit with specific instructions:

… (1) all the normal preliminary injunction factors, including likelihood of success on the merits, as to the named plaintiffs’ underlying habeas claims that the AEA does not authorize their removal pursuant to the President’s March 14, 2025, Proclamation, and (2) the issue of what notice is due, as to the putative class’s due process claims against summary removal. …

I hope you realize what a slap in the face the highlighted section is to the inferior courts. The inferior courts are well aware of the Winter factors. They are well aware of the order in which the factors should be evaluated.

This line is written to all inferior courts. It is a blunt warning that the inferior courts should apply the Winter factors, correctly, to any injunction (or stay) being granted.

The second part is the Supreme Court punting. They want somebody else to do the heavy lifting on “what notifications need to be given to afford a terrorist due process?”

The J.G.G. plaintiffs are claiming it is 30 days. The state has argued that 24 hours is more than enough. The Fifth is likely to come down with something closer to the state’s standing.

Another part of this, is that there is a question of “adequate notification.” The plaintiffs want the notifications to be in English and Spanish. The state provided the notifications in English only. Since these people are in the United States, it seems reasonable to ask that they figure out how to read an English document or get a translation.

And, as one pundit on X put it, the government should give notification to every criminal alien they currently have detained, and any new ones they pick up, a notification of deportation. This will start that clock running and whatever time is finally determined, the state will be that much closer to the time limit.

Finally, this injunction is not going to keep any of these criminal aliens in the United States.

If you are in our country illegally, you can be deported. That is a full stop. If you are a criminal alien, you can be deported.

Trump declared TdA to be Alien Enemies, then used the Alien Enemies Act to deport them.

He did not need to use the AEA!

All the focus on the AEA is a distraction. The Trump administration could load all those terrorists on to planes tomorrow morning as criminal aliens and ship them down to CECOT with no issues. As long as they don’t use the AEA for the source of authority.

What wasn’t addressed

The Solicitor General in oral arguments and in the briefings advanced the argument that universal injunctions are bad. That these rogue, inferior court judges do not have the authority to block the executive with nationwide injunctions.

This opinion does not address universal injunctions.

When Democrats are in office and a court issues a universal injunction, Sotomayer, Kegan, and Jackson Brown are in full agreement with the rest of the court that universal injunctions are wrong.

When Republicans are in office and a court issues a universal injunction, Sotomayer, Kegan, and Brown believe that universal injunctions are great.

Legal Games

This case should not be in front of the Supreme Court. It is here because of games played by the plaintiffs (bad guys).

The D.C. District court, having had their hands slapped, were on warning not to take cases outside their jurisdiction. This meant the case was filed in Texas, where the terrorists are housed, pending deportation.

The lawyers for the plaintiffs opened the case, then called the judge and demanded action. The transcript of that call was entered into the record by the judge. He was not happy.

The call was an ex parte communication. This is in violation of the Code of Conduct for Federal Judges, Canon 3(A)(4)) and Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 65(b)(1).

Regardless, the judge in the case was working on the complex issues involved in this case.

After the judge filed his remonstration of the plaintiffs’ lawyers, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a TRO.

They demanded the judge respond within 42 minutes, or they were going to appeal the case. 133 minutes after filling the motion, they filed an appeal to the Fifth Circuit.

The Supreme Court majority, seven justices, felt that the plaintiffs were right in appealing. Thomas and Alito dissented.

The case was moving rapidly, the judge was responding to the motions being filed. The important aspect of the judge’s response was he had given the state 24 hours to respond.

The plaintiffs knew this before they filed. The judge had pre-emptively told the state they had 24 hours to respond.

The plaintiffs didn’t like this. They felt that the judge should issue the injunction as if he were a robed, rogue D.C. district court activist, litigating from the bench. This Texas judge wasn’t a slave to the leftist agenda. He was doing his job correctly.

Conclusion

If Thomas and Alito are on one side of the argument, and you are on the other side, you are wrong. Having been there myself, I know of what I speak.

Alito and Thomas are superb at what they do. Trust them.

Final Thoughts

The Supreme Court majority was making judgments about what the inferior courts should have done with 20/20 hindsight. There are things in the record now that were not there when the lower courts issued their orders and opinions. Thomas and Alito point this out and tell the majority to follow proper procedures.

canadian attorney clowning around and banging the gavel on his head

Court Games

Judge Boasberg is a rogue judge. He has found himself as the judge of many cases dealing with Trump. For some reason, the magic lottery machine picks his name at “random” when the case involves Trump.

While it is true that you should never attribute to malice that which can adequately be explained by stupidity, this guy is not dumb.

He made it through Yale to be given a Bachelor’s. He then completed a Juris Doctor at Yale, then passed the bar. He was in private practice from 1991 though 1996. In 1996, he became an Assistant US Attorney for D.C. After 6 years, he was made an associate Judge at the Superior Court of DC. This is a “state” level court.

In 2011, Obama appointed him a Judge of the District Court, District of Columbia.

I don’t care what your politics are, you don’t make it to this point without having some level of smarts.

So this is not something that can be explained away by stupidity, leaving malice as the most likely cause.

Boasberg was slapped down by the Supreme Court in April. The Justices said that he did not have Jurisdiction in the case.

He knew this. He knew it when the case came before him. He issued a Preliminary Injunction, called it a TRO, then allowed the administration only a short time to accomplish the impossible.

Having been put in his place by the Supreme Court, he then proceeded to hold the administration in contempt of court for failure to follow his TRO.

It works like this, a party requests a TRO, asking for something, “bring me the head of that troublesome priest.” The judge grants the TRO. Now, the party ordered to do bring the head refuses.

They are now in contempt of court. They appeal, the Appeals court says, “you can’t order them to execute somebody.” The party no longer has to cut the head of that troublesome priest. They are still in contempt of court.

That is the power of a judge.

That is what Boasberg did. He gave a court order. That order was not followed out because it was not possible, nor was it an order he had the constitutional authority to issue. He has the case law to back him, though. He knew the administration would refuse, and therefore he gets to slap them with a contempt charge.

Having found the administration in contempt, the administration appealed to the Circuit Court and requested an administrative stay by the district court.

We are used to seeing this in Second Amendment cases, the district court finds for The People, the judge knows the state will appeal, he issues a 30-day administrative stay of their order to allow the state time to appeal.

This judge denied the motion for an administrative stay.

He ordered the government to assert they have custody of the people in CECOT. This means that the administration can be ordered to present any of them in court. If the administration does not assert custody of the deported Alien Enemies in CECOT, they must provide this rogue judge some other means of ordering them to bring terrorists before him.

The only other option he “granted” was for the administration to offer up a scapegoat to be vilified and punished by this rogue court.

Here and concurrently in the Court of Appeals, Defendants seek an emergency stay pending appeal of this Court’s Probable Cause Order. See ECF Nos. 80 (Probable Cause Order), 88 (Mot.), 89 (Mot. Br.). The Court will deny the Motion. The Court does not believe that Defendants have made an adequate showing on the merits, nor convincingly shown they will suffer irreparable harm in providing the information required by the Order. The public interest, furthermore, weighs in favor of permitting the Court’s contempt inquiry to proceed. See ECF No. 81 (Probable Cause Op.) at 2.

Among other problems, Defendants’ arguments rely on a misconstruction of the Court’s directive. Having found probable cause that they committed criminal contempt, the Court required Defendants to choose one of two paths. See Order at 1. First, they can opt to purge their probable contempt and explain to the Court how they will do so. Id. In its Opinion, the Court observed that the “most obvious way” for them to do so would be by choosing to “assert[] custody of the individuals who were removed in violation of the Court’s classwide TRO so that they might avail themselves of their right to challenge their removability through a habeas proceeding.” Op. at 43–44. In offering the Government a chance to voluntarily assert custody of the people it placed in a foreign prison, then, the Order did not “forc[e] the government to successfully execute foreign diplomacy” in violation of the separation of powers. See Mot. Br. at 11. The Court expressly allowed, moreover, that Defendants could “propose other methods of coming into compliance.” Op. at 44. Whether to purge the likely contempt, and whether to do so by voluntarily asserting custody of those individuals in Salvadoran jail, is entirely up to Defendants. If they do not want to “make what was wrong, right,” Abrego Garcia v. Noem, 2025 WL 1135112, at *1 (4th Cir. Apr. 17, 2025), they can choose the second path: identify the individual(s) whose conduct caused the noncompliance. See Order at 1. Although the Opinion noted that the Court might eventually refer this matter for prosecution, see Op. at 44 (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(a)(2)), we are not at that juncture. Their separation-of-powers arguments concerning any future prosecution(s), see Mot. Br. at 8–11, are therefore premature and misplaced.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS that Defendants’ [88] Emergency Motion for a Stay Pending Appeal is DENIED.
J.G.G. v. TRUMP, 1:25-cv-00766, (D.D.C. Apr 18, 2025) ECF No. 91